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The present social attitude towards agriculture is in disarray. The average person 
has developed more robust opinions about the ethical implications of agriculture; yet 
remains more removed from the actual practice itself than in any other time in history. 
Meanwhile, the growing popularity of ―ethical‖ foods such as organics, GM-free, etc., 
show the public‘s growing concern with food. This tension has introduced several 
misconceptions and failed judgments about agricultural products, putting greater social 
and governmental pressures on the industry as a whole. Because of this, it is important 
for philosophers to consider the ethical obligations of agriculture and its associated 
responsibilities to incorporate moral values into its future practices. The goal of this 
thesis is to confront these issues by developing a historical account of the industry and 
its guiding paradigm, engaging the paradigm‘s moral instability, and then offering a 
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 The present social attitude towards agriculture is in disarray. The average person 
has developed more robust opinions about the process and ethical implications of 
agriculture than previously; yet remains more removed and estranged from the actual 
practice itself than in any other time in history. As of the latest census, less than 1% of 
Americans engaged in agriculture for their livelihood.1 Meanwhile, the growing 
popularity of specialty foods such as organics, GM-free, hormone free, local, and 
seasonal goods show the public‘s growing particularity and education about food. This 
tension, however, has brought up several misconceptions and failed judgments about 
agricultural products, putting greater social and governmental pressures on the farmers 
and the industry as a whole. Ethical questions such as the welfare of food animals, the 
longterm sustainability of the industry and its practices, and the genetic makeup and 
health benefits of what is being harvested and raised, are now at the forefront of applied 
ethical works. However, unlike many other industries in this country, agriculture must 
balance the raising of actual living beings, and all of the associated complications that 
brings, with a market that demands the highest yields at the lowest cost. Other industries 
need only focus on market demands and have near complete control over the quality or 
                                                          




build of the product2. Not so with agriculture, at least not fully. The farmer must ensure 
the continued health of the product she is raising, as well as develop advanced 
managerial skills to survive financially. This balance makes ethical discussions so much 
more complicated than they are presently construed, and demands that we address all of 
the varied aspects of agriculture. To ignore one aspect is to commit a fallacy of oversight 
and to make one‘s ethical demands of the industry shortsighted and irresponsible. I 
believe the economic factors that influence the value set of agriculture, and the economic 
climate that drives the industry is one such aspect of ethical agriculture that is ignored 
with disastrous repercussions. 
 It should be the job of the philosopher to confront such ethical tensions that arise 
in society and certainly those that affect as central a role in human life as food 
production. A good ethical assessment must be broad enough to account for competing 
claims and complex situations, and endure criticism from varying angles. To be relevant, 
it must necessarily be pragmatic and situated in the time and culture we find ourselves 
in. An ethical theory that does not lend itself to real-world application would be about as 
useful as a university degree in Pig Latin. As Dr. Bernard Rollin succinctly puts it,  
―Those of us who work in applied ethics, i.e., who try to use ethical theory to help 
us change behavior or decide among real world choices or make the actual world 
a better place, cannot rest content with… theoretical formulations that don't hook 
into reality. For us, as it were, ethics must be an interpreted calculus, not an 
uninterpreted one.‖3  
 
                                                          
2 In the of automobiles, for example, the producer can rely on relative uniformity of raw materials 
and must account for very little variation between final products. This is due in large part to the 
amount of control and precision available in manufacturing materials that are relatively stable in 
both extraction and manipulation.  
3 Rollin, B. (2005). Reasonable Partiality and Animal Ethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice,  




An ethical theory should also be open to modification as more information is available 
and situations change. A static ethical theory is typically unable to account for paradigm 
shifts or unforeseen consequences of certain actions. Finally, a good ethic must also be 
able to develop and explain value sets and to regulate behavior in a way that allows for 
the best moral outcome.  
This is partially my goal in this work at least insofar as I will provide critiques of 
present ethical theories in agriculture and suggest future goals. Broadly, however, I hope 
to simply provide insight into the moral responsibilities in agriculture and hopefully 
confront those instances where it falls short. For the purposes of this work, I will focus 
only on the US dairy production and trends, although my conclusions could, with 
manipulation, be applied to all areas of agriculture. Given the purview of this work, and 
in the interest of keeping focus on the most important problems, I will not attempt to 
construct a complete ethical theory here, or spend much time on the metaethical 
implications. However, I do want to examine the current value set that undergirds the 
dairy industry in contrast to those of traditional husbandry. There is a great deal of 
evidence that suggests our current ethical system fails the aforementioned requirements.  
 It would be difficult to argue that the modus operandi of agricultural 
development since the very first seed was planted or animal domesticated has not been 
to produce enough food to stave off hunger. Specters of community-wide starvation still 
elicit a primal, basic fear response in us; the loss of such a basic and necessary 
commodity as food would put the entire social order into disarray. The basic value in 
food production is thus, ―not enough nutritious food is bad.‖ Another value that can be 
generally agreed upon, at least traditionally, is the idea of gratitude and symbiosis in our 
relationship with that which provides food. Such traditions as American Thanksgiving, 
the ubiquitous pre-meal prayers in every major religion, and husbandry practices speak 
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to this value. More recently in human history, as societies moved from mostly agrarian to 
mostly urban modes, food affordability has joined this list. In general, people no longer 
barter for food (and very few can produce their own) and must obtain it through a 
monetary transaction. Many social scientists have argued that this economic version of 
the ―non-starvation‖ value has become the primary concern in approaches to agriculture 
since the industrial revolution, the subsequent depressions, and world wars4. A segment 
of the speech from President Roosevelt on the passing of the Agricultural Act of 1938 
proves just this: 
―Gradually, through these years, the basic principles of national farm policy have 
become clear. By experience we have learned what must be done to assure to 
agriculture a fair share of an increasing national income, to provide consumers 
with abundant supplies of food and fiber…We are agreed that the real and lasting 
progress of the people of farm and city alike will come, not from the old familiar 
cycle of glut and scarcity, not from the succession of boom and collapse, but from 
the steady and sustained increases in production and fair exchange of things that 
human beings need.‖5 
 
 In general, the priorities and values which guide our present agriculture practices 
have certainly afforded us greater yield and low-cost food, but at what price? Aside from 
the traditional ―Malthusian fears‖ which will be discussed later, there is another set of 
values that have replaced tradition, and should be examined. I argue that, especially in 
the case of dairy, these values have stripped the animal and the farmer of longevity and 
significantly weakened the constitution and integrity of the system and its parts—quite 
contrary to the goals of the New Deal. For example, the modern dairy cow, as compared 
to her counterpart only 40 years ago, averages only two and a half lactations (2.5 years of 
production) before she cannot produce enough to make a profit for the farmer and is 
                                                          
4 Q.v., Thurman & Kilman (2009) Enough: Why the World’s Poorest Starve in an Age of Plenty,  
Ferguson, J. (2006) Global Shadows, and Browne, K.E. (2009) Economics and Morality: 
Anthropological Approaches. 




sent to slaughter.6 In contrast, her ancestors were ranked and valued for their ability to 
produce offspring and for the number of her production years. An entire section in a 
1940‘s introductory husbandry textbook is devoted to celebrating ―record cows,‖ a theme 
in many of the older textbooks I perused. Two excellent examples mentioned are Ionia 
Sadie, a 13 year old Holstein cow that produced over 230,000 pounds of milk in her 
lifetime, and Barclay‘s Betty, a 21 year old Ayrshire breed with a life-time record of 
200,131 pounds of milk produced and was the dam of 16 calves that produced 1200 
descendants.7,8 This could only be accomplished by great care and attention to the cow 
and an emphasis on quality of life and welfare of the animal in addition to production 
capability. In fact, much of traditional husbandry emphasizes the care and kindness 
necessary for proper dairying9.  
 The average yearly production of Ionia or Betty would now be considered below 
average by almost 4,000lbs of milk yearly, but their longevity would be an anomaly. 
Interestingly, traditional husbandry had taught for generations that a dairy cow does not 
reach full maturity until five years of age (usually coinciding with the third lactation) and 
reaches full lactation potential by seven years of age;10 however, average productive life 
for today‘s dairy cattle is just over two years. Temple Grandin and many other animal 
scientists have attributed this great loss in longevity to the genetic and physical pressures 
                                                          
 
7 Anderson, A.L. (1943). Introductory Animal Husbandry, p. 276. 
8 As an interesting aside, the record producer now is a three year-old Holstein, Ever-Green-View 
My 1326-ET EX-92, who produced 72,170 pounds of milk in 365 days, completing her record in 
February, 2010 (Holstein USA publication, February 2010). 
9 Q.v., Baker, A.H (1911), Henderson (1917), and Anderson, A.L. (1943). 
10 Ibid. These results were also published in 1923 by C. H. Eckles and his team at UC Davis; 
provided as a historical marker. Results of a DHI (a leading dairy and herd management firm) 




with which we saddle these animals.11 The social and ethical consequences of this trend 
are manifold and must be considered. However, this shorter number of lactations is not 
just an ethical dilemma, but an economic one as well. At present there are around 9.1 
million head of milking dairy cattle, which means that every year each of these cows 
mother a calf and thus there are also 9.1 million heifers ready to be put into production. 
If longevity of the milking cows is increased, there would therefore be a dramatic 
increase in the total milking cow population—which is both unnecessary and does not 
ensure the welfare of the animals as overcrowding would surely follow. This ethical knot 
is not easy to untangle. It is right for the public to begin to question the integrity of our 
agricultural system, but it remains of great importance to engage these problems with 
the most rational and pragmatic of philosophical insights so that both the public and the 
farmer can flourish without impediment.  
Dairy farming, in particular, has very distinct ethical dilemmas built into the 
practice. As in all agriculture, dairy is built on the extraction of food from a biological 
system—obviously, the cow in our case. Thus, how the farmer cares for and maintains 
her herd is ethically relevant and directly related to the production of goods. Unlike most 
other food animal industries, however, the dairy cow must be maintained much longer 
than its initial production. With meat-animals, the animal is raised until it is fit for 
slaughter, and then fulfills its production ―contract.‖ The contract between the farmer 
and the dairy cow goes much further as, hopefully, the production life of a dairy cow 
exceeds its first lactation. The required maintenance creates another level of ethical 
consideration, especially in terms of the ability of the farmer to manipulate the cow's 
physiology to maximize its production value. Our impact on the genetic constitution of 
                                                          
11 Grandin, T. (2008). A Major Change. Animal Ethics Reader, 2nd Ed. p. 229. 
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the cow is of supreme consequence for the purposes of this paper, has implications on 
animal welfare, and is closely related to the economic fitness of the industry.  
 Directly connected to animal care for dairy is economic viability—dairy farming is 
after all a business, and carries with it far more subtle ethical considerations than the 
treatment of animals. Business practices have a direct effect on societies in a way that 
human-animal relations do not. The participation of business or corporate interest in 
domestic affairs is well documented in the social sciences, and should not be overlooked. 
The food industry has an even more intimate relationship with society for quite obvious 
reasons: they provide a necessary good and directly affect the health and wellbeing of 
their consumers, in addition to stimulating the economy and participating in global trade 
and safety. The combination of welfare and economic factors, and their mutual influence 
on each other, presents us with an ethical knot. There is a conflict of interest in 
agriculture between those of traditional husbandry and the needs of industry and the 
values that entails (i.e. industriousness, efficiency, and frugality). The bigger question I 
will ask in this work spins around this axis: when other issues of ethical import are 
mixed with those of business, is it inevitable that such ethical issues become subsumed 
under business? And if so, is that a problem? I will argue that it was when husbandry 
practices and the values that underlie them were replaced or made lesser than the 
concerns of industry, we began to see the degradation of animal welfare in return for 
dramatically higher yields. As one example among several, the increased culling that 
results from weak cows hurts the farmer as she must constantly account for replacement 
cows, introducing higher costs among other issues. Such examples, paired with a market 
system that does not favor the farmer in the first place, raise a more succinct version of 
the axial question I just proposed: is the current industrial system of dairy farming 








CHAPTER  1:   The History of Dairy 
 
1.1 Husbandry and Industry 
 
 
 To make any claims against the current dairy industry, it is first important to 
have an adequate understanding of its historical roots. From here we can observe the 
transition of values and the process which led to the corporatization of dairy. Even from 
the beginning of written history, the dairy cow has been a part of social livelihood. There 
is some evidence that the precursor to the cow and goat (another domestic, ruminant 
animal) was domesticated before any permanent settlements, with the earliest written 
records dating back to Indian Vedic times as long ago as 3,000 BCE.12 Since then, the 
cow has slowly evolved to the beast we presently recognize. Significant changes in milk 
production capacities of Bos Taurus happened slowly over many generations and almost 
imperceptibly. It wasn't until the 19th century when the great social migration from the 
land to the cities and scientific breeding studies emerged, thanks to Mendel and 
Darwin‘s work13, that dairy took a sharp turn.  
Traditional animal care associated with agriculture, dairy included, was termed 
―husbandry‖ and included specific practices, values, and a decision-making tools. As 
Bernard Rollin, philosopher and animal ethicist, characterizes it, husbandry ―means 
‗good care‘ associated with mutual self-interest…or the ancient contract between humans 
                                                          
12 Pirtle, T.R. (1926). History of the Dairy Industry, p. 2. 
13 Many early dairy texts reference the growing acceptance of Mendel‘s Law of Heredity 
(published 1865) and Darwinian theories on evolution gave precedence to heredity research as 
revolutionizing breed registry organizations and breeding practices (Pirtle (1926), Yapp & Nevens, 
(1911), Anderson (1943), Roberts (1920) to name a few). 
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and agricultural animals.‖14 The metaphor of the biblical shepherd and his flock 
reinforces this idea and can serve as a reference for the undergirding values of 
husbandry. Rollin continues by explaining, ―The concept of animal husbandry 
represented a very powerful ethic that was sanctioned by prudence and self-interest.‖15 
In the absence of the exacting scientific measurements we now possess, the overall 
welfare of the animal was assumed from its ability to produce well and gain weight, 
interact socially, and other directly observable measures. It was common knowledge that 
rough handling, cruelty, and overwhelming stress negatively affected all of those 
characteristics. A paradigm example of this can be found in a section on ―handling the 
herd‖ in a prominent dairy cattle feeding and management manual from 1917,  
―To keep up the production of a cow one must always treat her with kindness. 
The beating of a cow should never be tolerated under any circumstances. It is not 
only cruel but it cuts down the production of milk. A man that cannot control his 
temper will never make a good dairyman. Any excessive disturbances should be 
avoided for the sake of the more sensitive animals.‖16 
 
 
Maintaining welfare standards for the animals, and thus how they were cared for, was 
symbiotically good for the farmer and mutually ensured the best interest of the animal.  
A rather interesting historical publication on the practice of husbandry dated 
1799 by the gentleman and land owner Richard Parkinson17 associates those who treat 
animals without respect as ―idle, drunk fellows‖ and ―barbarous,‖ and should be 
―shunned from the profession‖ because of lack of respect showed to the animal and its 
―contribution to society.‖18 Another interesting historical note can be found in the 
                                                          
14 Rollin, B. (2006). Animal Rights & Human Morality, p. 330. 
15 Ibid. 331. 
16 Henderson, H.O. (1917). Dairy Cattle Feeding and Management, 3rd ed. p.234.  
17 The opening of the work begins with a dedication to the recently deceased George Washington, 
which Parkinson signed as his ―most devoted, obedient, and humble servant.‖ This was perhaps 
the end of the age of the ―Gentlemen Farmer.‖  
18 Parkinson, R. (1799). The Experienced Farmer: In Two Volumes, p. 116. 
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introduction to Yapp and Neven‘s 1926 ―Dairy Cattle‖ compendium, titled, ―Shall I be a 
Dairyman?‖ Gender inequities aside, it is a rather sweet introduction. For them, the 
characteristics of a good dairyman are (1) A love of cattle, (2) Willingness to work hard 
and for long hours, (3) Capacity for attending to details, and (4) Ability to overcome 
disappointments. The first point is especially interesting and is elaborated,  
―Occasionally a man will be successful with livestock without possessing any 
particular fondness for animals. But in order to derive a satisfying pleasure out of 
working with animals, one must have a real love for them. A liking for animals, 
which will make it a pleasure to go to the barn at night to see if they are 
comfortable and which will make one‘s ―blood boil‖ to see an animal abused, is 
invaluable to the dairyman.‖19 
 
Such requirements on the feeling and values of the farmer should not be considered 
mere historical novelties or remnants of a pastoral idyll long since abandoned. Inevitably 
in conversing with a farmer in any field, to the question, ―why do you do it?‖ the 
response is always something to the effect of, ―It is a lifestyle choice. I find satisfaction in 
the work and love what I do.‖ This kind of deep-set value for the profession and what it 
entails should not be ignored.  
 Around the end of the 19th century, the production of butter and cheese (those 
dairy products that could be stored and shipped with relative ease) moved off-farm and 
was overseen by production companies. This was aided by advances in creamery systems 
and tests for purity.20 Around this time (1888 to be exact), the refrigerator train car was 
invented, thus supplying farm-fresh dairy to the growing urban centers.21 New 
technology and industry allowed distributors to meet the demand of the new urban-
dwellers who now lived too far away from the dairy farm to buy directly from them, 
                                                          
19 Yapp, W.W. & Nevens, W.B. (1926). Dairy Cattle: Selection, Feeding and Management, p. 13. 
20 Pirtle, T.R. (1926). History of the Dairy Industry, p. 8, 78. 
21 ARS Timeline. 
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streamlining the process. This is a significant change in market structure and is the most 
distinct beginning point for the shift in value sets for dairymen in general. As 
distributors gained greater economic hold on dairy for cities, mostly because of the 
advent of these refrigerator trucks, reliable pasteurization, and more intelligent company 
marketing, the consumer now had very little need to directly interact with the farmer. 
The market was now primarily in the control of the distribution companies. Thus the 
demands of the distributor took precedence over the decisions of the farmer. The farmer 
was encouraged to produce more and more, while marketing schemes reinforced the 
health benefits of dairy consumption to increase demand. The burgeoning science of 
breeding and ―dairy improvement‖ projects at the time, however, could only subtly 
manipulate production. Care of the animal and the need for longevity still held 
precedence, with the industrializing of creameries merely laying the economic 
groundwork for a transition away from husbandry practices. 
 Shortly following World War I and II and the intervening Great Depression, the 
resurgence of Malthusian fears recaptured the imagination of the public, further 
pressuring food producers to increase their yields. Economist Thomas Malthus 
determined in the late 18th century that food production was increasing at a far slower 
rate than was needed for the growing human population22. Although this was 
immediately criticized by his contemporaries and considered generally false and 
                                                          
22 "The power of population is so superior to the power of the earth to produce subsistence for 
man that premature death must in some shape or other visit the human race. The vices of 
mankind are active and able ministers of depopulation. They are the precursors in the great army 
of destruction, and often finish the dreadful work themselves. But should they fail in this war of 
extermination, sickly seasons, epidemics, pestilence, and plague advance in terrific array, and 
sweep off their thousands and tens of thousands. Should success be still incomplete, gigantic 
inevitable famine stalks in the rear, and with one mighty blow levels the population with the food 
of the world.‖ 
—Malthus T.R. (1798). An Essay on the Principle of Population, (p.61). J Johnson, London. 
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irrelevant23, the world wars reignited these fears. After the great wars, population 
continued to grow and economic straits affected most of the population, causing 
Malthusian apocalypse theory to again rear its head—with widespread consequences. As 
political scientist and agriculture ethicist William Browne asserts, ―Malthusian fears 
have led at least indirectly to massive government intervention in agriculture over 
time.‖24 We must remember at this time that America was in the throes of an obsession 
with industry and technology. The unparalleled success of Ford‘s production line and the 
growing fascination the government had with scientific and technological answers to 
large social problems saw the US government taking an increased interest in scientific 
answers to food production, safety, and distribution issues. New Deal programs such as 
the Farm Security Administration, which provided incentives for coalescing farms and 
efficiency measures, and the Agricultural Adjustment act of 1938, which mandated low 
prices for food and fiber products and created ―commodity programs‖ to respond to 
supply and demand issues, are two examples of such changes. These measures effectively 
paved the road for corporate management to take the reins of agriculture production as 
―good farm management practices‖ grew to include social mandates.  
 Another important social incentive towards industrializing agriculture came in 
1953 with the formation of the US Agriculture Research Service (ARS). During World 
War II, the USDA‘s various research components were brought together into the 
Agricultural Research Administration, which in 1953 was reorganized into ARS. As the 
official website proclaims,  
―The Agricultural Research Service is the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture's chief scientific research agency. Our job is finding solutions to 
                                                          
23 William Hazlitt (1807), John Stuart Mill (1829), Henry George (1879), Ester Boserup (1965), 
and Julian Lincoln Simon (1981) are a few notable opponents. 
24 Browne, W.P. (2000). Agricultural Biotechnology, Law, and Social Impacts of Agricultural 
 Biotechnology. Encyclopedia of Ethical, Legal, and Policy Issues in Biotechnology, p. 49. 
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agricultural problems that affect Americans every day, from field to table…Our 
scientists frequently collaborate with research partners from universities, 
companies, other organizations and other countries.‖25  
One can safely translate this to a reliance on private research companies to find solutions 
to perceived agricultural problems. Interestingly, these ―private research companies‖ are 
all owned or funded by the distribution companies. Since its original inception, it has 
become far more congenial to social needs and pressures, but in its original inception 
took a much more paternalistic approach.  
 The involvement of the USDA in farming is of course complex and cannot, 
barring the lunacy of certain reactionary groups, be said to have a wholly negative or 
reproachable effect on the formation of present-day agriculture. In reading their official 
timeline I did notice, however, that especially after the turn of the century and WW1 
especially, the type and form of research being conducted (either by ARS or derivative 
departments) was focused on producing commercially successful products instead of 
traditional husbandry values, including individual farmer needs or animal welfare. In the 
dairy industry, we see this in the research in pasteurization and improved taste and 
shelf-life in 1902 and 1917; a long-term study of dairy improvement (1917) which 
increased production per cow from 542 pounds of butterfat in 1920 to more than 720 
pounds two decades later; and later the creation of the first artificial breeding 
cooperative organized for dairy cattle in 1938.26 This can be compared to the protocols 
pre-1900: the eradication of bovine pneumonia in 1892; research into cattle ticks in 
1893; work projects organized for farm youth (later called 4-H); and finally the Lacey Act 
in 1900, which prohibited importation of injurious animals, birds, and fish27 to protect 
livestock. The research measures after 1890 were in large part influenced by government 
                                                          
25 ARS Timeline. 




initiatives aimed at making US agriculture a profitable industry28. As these interests now 
represented a significant monetary investment and source of capital, these were the 
interests focused on in research. These new technologies were expensive and not 
applicable to all methods of farming, leading to a natural selection in farm types and 
economic status where commercial farms were favored over smaller, lower producing 
ones. The cycle continued: the country saw a decrease in the percentage of people 
involved in agriculture (43% in 1890, 11% by 1950, less than 2% at present), and an 
increase in tenant farming,29 showing a trend in farm consolidation and fewer people 
controlling more of the agricultural sector. By the same token, productivity in all areas of 
agriculture skyrocketed despite the reduced farmer population.  
 In dairy, although slower to respond, a dramatic shift is seen in both productivity 
of cows individually, and the number of cows on farms. From 1900 to 1940 total milk 
production nearly doubled and then changed dramatically after 196030. The average cow 
now produces almost six times more than the average yearly amount compared to her 
1900s counterpart. Similarly, total production has now tripled from the 1900s accounts, 
and yet from the same data we see the number of cows in the US has shrunk by almost 
sixty percent over the same time period31. Keeping with the other trend of farm 
consolidation, the US Census of Agriculture historical reports show that in 1920 there 
were 710,694 dairy farms with average of less than 80 head of milking cows,32 while 
                                                          
28 This can be deduced from the growing number of acts and laws passed regulating food/fiber 
trade and federal incentives in efficient production, q.v. 1894-Carey Land Grant Act, 1897- Tea 
Importation Act, 1901-Bureu of Plant Industry established, 1917-Federal Farm Loan Act, (ARS 
Timeline). 
29 Ibid. 
30 (figure 2), can be found at the end of the chapter. 
31 (figures 1 and 2), can be found at the end of the chapter. 




presently there are less than 75,000,33 with an average of 130 cows per farm (depending 
on the region) with many farms exceeding 20,000 head. This means that more cows 
populate fewer farms and produce more milk than ever. Economically this would seem to 
be a wild success. 
 This process is in part due to what ecologist/sociologist William Lacy, UC Davis, 
calls the ―treadmill process.‖ As new production technology allows farmers to produce 
more while reducing the costs of production, early adopters of the technology are the 
ones reaping substantial profits. They produce more than their neighbor can with a 
comparable investment of time, labor, and capital. Lacy explains that:  
―As more and more people adopt the new technology, total production rises and 
prices begin to fall. Those operating with the old technologies find themselves 
operating at a loss, and they often go out of business. On the other hand, those 
who adopt the new technology, find that higher profits disappear and they are 
producing more food to retain the same income level.‖34  
 
 
This partially explains the cycle previously described in terms of technology 
development and the consolidation of farms nation-wide. Typically in any industry only 
those who have enough financial buffers can afford new profit-increasing technologies. 
Those who cannot afford to make the upgrades eventually fall by the wayside; however 
those who do make the changes find themselves having to produce greater quantities to 
stay in business. The mechanism for change in farming is thus self-selecting and fast 
paced, while also being largely economically based. What this leads to is a dairy industry 
populated by only those farms that shared the same goals that the ARS and similar 
research groups were promoting, and those research groups in turn catered only to those 
farms able to support them. I believe this economic and technological model for change, 
                                                          
33 Ibid, 2006. 
34 Lacy, W. (2000). Agricultural Biotechnology, Socioeconomic Issues, and the Fourth Criterion.  
Encyclopedia of Ethical, Legal, and Policy Issues in Biotechnology, p. 80. 
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while keeping in mind the social climate of the times, accounts for most of the reasons 
behind the dramatic shifts in dairy farming and the dominant value-systems that still 
influence it. It is in this trajectory that we see many of the inconsistencies and issues in 
agriculture, especially dairy, which need evaluation. 
 
 




 A very brief examination of some of the dominant technologies and 
advancements in dairying is necessary before a value assessment can be undertaken. 
Foremost in importance for our discussion is the practice of trait-specific breeding for 
high production, ubiquitous and excessive chemicals such as Bovine Somatotropin (bST) 
use, and overpopulation in environmentally deficient conditions. While there are 
different concerns that others have introduced which may carry import, a study of these 
select issues will provide adequate evidence for the inconsistencies I hope to show in the 
values held by the industry and the results produced. While I will be taking a mostly 
negative approach to the use and application of these technologies, I hope to avoid the 
accusation of being a Luddite—it is not my intention to disparage the ability of science to 
confront and potentially solve problems in agriculture, which it has certainly done on 
occasion. I intend only to point out that many of the most prevalent of such technologies 
has had unintended and reprehensible effects, and that this has happened because of 










 Temple Grandin, a noted animal scientist, has suggested that the breeding 
practices of modern stockmanship are creating a number of problems in welfare and 
farm management including a plateau in production levels, the increasing need for and 
costs of drug and specialized food inputs, and shorter productivity lifespan of animals.35 
Furthermore, increased incidents of lameness in dairy cattle due to early-onset bone loss 
and poor muscle development have required excess culling of cows that are otherwise 
high producers.36 Historically, breeding in dairy cattle focused on the promotion of 
several traits through generations; the most important being high quality and quantity of 
production (total amount of milk and percent butterfat) and the physical attributes 
associated with this, a vigorous constitution and strong physique (measured by 
longevity), psychological disposition, quickness of maturity and growth, and ability to 
produce calves expressed as early dates of first parity (pregnancy) and success of long-
term reproductive cycles.37  
 For the farmer in rural antiquity, the constitution, vigor, and longevity of the cow 
were just as important as productivity, as the loss of one cow could mean ruin to him. 
Thus, balancing all of the aforementioned traits was of great consequence to the farmer. 
While some improvements were badly needed, inadequate knowledge of genetics kept 
breeding practices at an elementary level with the adage, ―like makes like‖ as the guiding 
principle. Inconsistencies in herd make-up and unpredictability of traits in new 
generations slowed the development of dairying, and could only be addressed as new 
                                                          
35 Grandin, T. (2008). A Major Change. Animal Ethics Reader, 2nd Ed. p. 229. 
36 Ibid.  
37 Baker, A.H. (1911). Live stock: A Cyclopedia for the Farmer and Stock Owner, p. 644. 
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developments in genetic research were accomplished. Gregor Mendel‘s findings in 
genetics and heredity, as was already discussed, did just this and farms were able to 
slowly correct these issues. This meant greater control over the genotypic makeup of a 
herd, improving overall production and efficiency immensely. As farm systems 
progressed to house greater numbers of milking cows, the loss of individual cows 
affected the herd and production less, making vigor and constitution an ancillary or 
intermediate concern. A review of breeding practices from the beginning of the 20th 
century onward show an increased pressure to breed for productivity and growth rate 
above all else. While this may be a natural, economic transition for the dairy industry, it 
is obviously not in the best interest of the cow. 
 As early as 1923, husbandry texts begin to speak in greater length on selecting for 
production traits, with considerations of other traits occupying footnotes at best.38 
Emphasis on consulting production records of sires and dams and establishing pureness 
or ―homozygosity‖ of a productive genotype in herds is treated as a best practice by the 
end of the World Wars.39 This was done to ensure greater predictability of genotype in 
the offspring, allowing farmers to have better control over the success of their herd. 
Pedigree and progeny records of this time, the tools farmers used when selecting sires for 
breeding, included only the number of offspring, production comparisons between dams 
and offspring, and butterfat content of milk.40 Research protocols in ―dairy 
improvement‖ consisted of only those studies which aimed at improving these traits.41 
Consequently, there was a sharp decrease in genetic lines of the various breeds, selected 
based almost exclusively on the traits outlined above. This happened especially after the 
                                                          
38 Pirtle, T.R. (1926). History of the Dairy Industry, p. 31. 
39 Anderson, A.L. (1943). Introductory Animal Husbandry, p. 309. 
40 Ibid. 310. 
41 ARS Timeline. 
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creation of the first artificial breeding cooperative organized for dairy cattle in 1938.42 In 
1990, for example, only two sires accounted for nearly 25% of genes in the Holstein 
breed.43,44 This level of trait-specific selection and control of genetic lines is an industry 
unto itself and has had the most wide-spread and deep effects on the dairy industry 
compared to any other practice. Even the definition of ―welfare‖ changed in this time 
from the generally common sense view that good welfare is the same as a ―happy cow‖ to 
the now common definition that welfare is measured by production capacity. A 1981 
industry report from the Counsel on Agricultural Science and Technology (CAST) serves 
as a paradigm example: 
―The principle criteria used thus far as indexes of the welfare of animals in 
production systems has been rate of growth or production, efficiency of feed use, 
efficiency of reproduction, mortality and morbidity.‖45 
 
 
 While production levels for the dairy cow have never been higher, scientists are 
beginning to question the goals of the breeding practice as many complications are 
arising. General heritability research, as noted by scientist Alois Essl, University of 
Vienna Natural Resources and Life Sciences, has shown for years that, ―reproductive 
traits are non-linear due to directional dominance and recessive deleterious mutations, 
with heritabilities being higher on the lower fitness side.‖46 This means that if 
reproductive traits are not sufficiently considered in artificial selection, subsequent 
generations will show an increased unfitness in reproductive abilities. It has been well 
                                                          
42 Ibid.  
43 Cassell, B. (2009). Inbreeding. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Extension,  
publication, p. 2. 
44 This translates into millions of head and can account for an entire operation‘s population as 
many farmers tend to seek homozygosity in their herds. 
45 From: Rollin, B. (2006). Animal Rights and Human Morality (3rd ed). Prometheus Books. New  
York.  




documented that reproduction rates of the dairy cow have been steadily decreasing over 
the past fifty years, with current studies showing a decrease in fertility rates of nearly 
35% since 195047. It is believed that physiological adaptations to high milk production 
may explain part of the reproductive decline, in addition to greater incidences of such 
reproductive diseases as metritis and cystic ovary.48 Supporting this belief, several 
studies suggest that there is a significantly positive correlation between disease or 
complications and high-production traits, especially in udder health, reproduction, and 
lameness49. It is not out of the question to believe some of this is due as well to the 
reduction of genetic strains that make up her populations—minor susceptibilities to 
disease or mutation in the origin strains can be exponentially magnified in subsequent 
generations as the gene pool continues to shrink, causing stronger expressions of these 
traits. 
 The physiological adaptations to higher production are important to recognize as 
well. A faster growth rate but poor muscle and fat development, and the constant gain 
and loss of nearly 15lbs of milk every day are a strain on the cow. It is no wonder that 
average productive life of the cow decreases as average milk production increases. 
Related to the studies of poor reproductive ability is the now accepted scientific tenet of 
negative correlation between early reproduction (due to a faster rate of maturity) and a 
shorter lifespan50—another of the primary selected traits discussed above. 
                                                          
47 For a list of relevant studies, q.v. Lucy, M C. (2001). Reproductive Loss in High-Producing 
Dairy Cattle: Where Will it End? Journal of Dairy Science, 84(6). 
48 Metritis is the inflammation of the walls of the uterus. Cystic ovary is a condition where 
abnormally large ovarian follicles form that fail to ovulate. While neither of these diseases 
preclude an ability to reproduce, they do reduce it and cause severe physiological problems. 
49 Van Dorp, et al (1998) provides a literature study. 
50 The tenet that ―mammals with long life expectancy tend to be late in maturing‖ is one 
exhaustively researched. See literature study by Finch (1990) for greater detail. 
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 The decrease in the average productive life of dairy cattle is less studied, mostly 
because it has not been extremely profitable to keep a cow past its fifth lactation since 
improved breeding and large-scale herd management was developed, making calving 
and ―replacement cows‖ less expensive. Early husbandry texts up to modern practices 
affirm this because, as Essl later asserts,  
―Livestock animals have to both stay alive and reproduce regularly to be of 
economic interest for the breeder. Therefore, the average lifespan of livestock 
animals is far below their biological potential and disposals due to old age are 
rare. The lifespan of a female farm animal is often partitioned in two time 
periods, (i) the costly period from birth to first parity and (ii) the following 
productive period until disposal.‖51 
 
The problem scientists are now seeing is not that the cow no longer reaches her 
biological potential, for she was never allowed to, it is that the second period ―from 
productivity until disposal‖ is becoming shorter. As a general rule, a dam must give birth 
every season to maintain milk production. It was typical pre-1950 for a cow to last into 
its 5th lactation and still maintain consistent production and reproduce.52 This is still a 
couple years off of its biological peak, but far closer than present statistics. Less than half 
of all dairy cows now reach their third parity or lactation due to either inconsistent 
production or lack of fertility.53 As discussed earlier, the physiological mutations and 
increased incidence of disease due to high production are prime causes in both of those 
problems. 
 In terms of disease prevention and reproductive viability, the research is tending 
towards a rejection of single trait selection for high productivity. All of the studies just 
mentioned suggested a selection bias for physical strength and reproductive health over 
                                                          
51 Essl, A. (1998). Longevity in Dairy Cattle Breeding: A Review. Livestock Production Science, 57,  
p. 81. 
52 Anderson, A.L. (1943). Introductory Animal Husbandry, p. 266. 
53 Hare, E. (2006). Survival Rates and Productive Herd Life of Dairy Cattle in the United States.  
Journal of Dairy Science, 89(9), p. 3716-9. 
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high production as the most promising solution. If only to be exhaustive, scientists have 
drawn the obvious parallel between a genetic predisposition to disease and an increased 
use of antibiotics and other drugs—an expense that is quickly increasing for dairy 
farms—which has raised environmental concerns of an overabundance of antibiotics and 
pollutants seeping into ground water and adversely affecting the surrounding area, 
including increasing drug resistance.  
 From an economic perspective, these results do not bode well for the farmer. The 
cow‘s resilience in the face of production stress directly affects the farmer‘s overall ability 
to maintain a consistently profitable enterprise. Increased maintenance costs in the form 
of antibiotics and drug therapy, a greater demand for specialty foods that improve 
declining health, and the cost of breeding more replacement cows at a faster rate due to a 
shorter production life, are just a few examples of how lessened resilience can affect the 
economic health of a dairy farm. It seems that these practices, while profitable in the 
immediate future, fail to be so in the long term. 
 More recent studies and initiatives in the industry show a greater understanding 
of these problems and offer solutions based on trait selection for the length of productive 
life (PL). These studies are finding positive results in increased fertility rates and 
stronger overall constitution of the animal, but the effects of these studies are uncertain 
and acceptance is presently limited54. In general, we can safely conclude that the welfare 
of the cow—and thus the livelihood of the farmer—are significantly diminished due to 
short-sighted breeding practices. Continued genetic pressure on the animal to produce at 
a higher level will only exacerbate these problems. Perhaps a focus on increasing the 
productive lifespan rather than just production would be a viable solution. One may find 
it interesting that an edited version of the traditional correlation between welfare and 
                                                          
54 (Weigel, 327) 
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productivity is reemerging, serving as a reminder of the symbiotic relationship between 
man and the farm animal. 
 





 We have already seen that an increased reliance on drug use in dairying is the 
result of a weaker overall physiology from genetic pressures, but there are other uses for 
agricultural medication that are relevant to our discussion. Jeffery Burkhardt, professor 
of biotechnology ethics at the University of Florida has called the use of feed or injection 
administered drugs the ―second tier‖ of biotechnology, with the first being genetic 
manipulation. As he explains it, ―For animal agriculture, the second tier in biotechnology 
is: organisms or chemical substances that might be injected or added to feed in order to 
help prevent disease, augment nutrition, and increase control of milk or egg or meat 
production.‖55 There are obvious reasons why such technology would be developed, 
especially in light of our previous discussion. Larger farms began needing a replacement 
for the labor-intensive methods of traditionally dealing with diseases, nutrition and slow 
milk production—an increased number of cows in a given system made each of these 
issues exponentially larger and harder to manage. The use of production-enhancing 
drugs, one form of 2nd-tier biotechnology, has been controversial since their inception, 
and none so much as Monsanto‘s Bovine Somatotropin (bST).56  
                                                          
55 Burkhardt, J. (2000). Agricultural Biotechnology, Ethics, Family Farms, and Industrialization. 
 Encyclopedia of Ethical, Legal and Policy Issues in Biotechnology, p. 15. 
56 While Monsanto has sold the rights to bST in 2008 to Lilly-Elanco, they are the research 
machine responsible for its creation and initial distribution. 
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 The purpose of bST is to greatly increase the efficiency of milk production while 
only marginally increasing animal feed intake. This is done by ―a series of orchestrated 
changes in the metabolism of body tissues so that more nutrients can be used for milk 
synthesis.‖57,58 Increased ovulation and reception during artificial insemination has also 
been reported.59 The first official studies on the effects of using bST on dairy herds were 
done in 1982, but the ubiquitous use of it in a majority of dairies in the US didn‘t occur 
until the 1990s.60 Presently, it is common practice to give a consistent, injected dosage of 
bST to all cows. Private companies and industry titans have put much effort and research 
into proving the beneficial use of bST, and present-day introductory livestock textbooks 
celebrate its use.61 Many farms have adopted similar practices of ubiquitous use with 
antibiotics and other drugs as a preventative measure, supposedly ensuring the health of 
the cattle while requiring less hands-on and detailed management. Official reports by the 
product‘s creator, Monsanto, assure producers that the use of bST has no detrimental 
effects on cattle or the consumer, and deny claims that increased milk production is 
linked to reduced production life or reproductive decline.62 Additionally, production 
increases have been reported to double when it is used.63  
 In opposition to many of Monsanto‘s official reports, noted scientists have found 
competing evidence. While bST‘s ability to increase production and stimulate ovulation 
                                                          
57 Bauman, D E. (1992). Bovine Somatotropin: Review of an Emerging Animal Technology.  
Journal of Dairy Science, 75(12), p. 3432. 
58 It is worth noting that Bauman‘s article and much of the research used were sponsored by 
Genetech and their parent company, Monsanto. This was deduced from his references. 
59 Ibid. 3437. 
60 Ibid. 3435. 
61 Gillespie, J.R. & Flanders, F.B. (2009). Modern Livestock and Poultry Production, 8th ed. p.  
225. 
62 Bauman, D E. (1992). Bovine Somatotropin: Review of an Emerging Animal Technology.  
Journal of Dairy Science, 75(12), p. 3441. 
63 Peel, C. J., Hurd, D. L., Madsen, K. S., & G. de Kerchove. (1989). In Proceedings, Monsanto 
 Technical Symposium, Oct. 24 
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is undeniable, its effect on the cow is questionable. Reports that the use of bST treatment 
―was associated with an increased culling rate presumably as a result of increased stress 
associated with higher milk production,‖64 should give bST users pause. Other reports 
have found that as the amount of bST increased, the total body condition score 
decreased, producing more emaciated cows.65 Still others associated bST use with 
increased incidence of lameness and poor musculature.66 These findings were confirmed 
more recently as the result of a long-term study of effects in Canada, where they found a 
nearly 25% increase in the risk of clinical mastitis, a 40% reduction in fertility and 55% 
increased risk of developing clinical signs of lameness.67 One of the results of the early 
findings of this study was the banning of bST use in Canada in 1999.68 
 An equally hard look should be given to all antibiotic and drug usage for dairy 
cattle, and decisions carefully considered as to not commit the same errors of short-
sightedness that we see here. As with our conclusions about breeding practices and their 
effect on animal welfare and economic irresponsibility, similar aspersions are cast upon 
the present use of bST and similar drugs. The European Union effectively banned the use 
of bST in 2000, joining Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and Australia. A similar practice 
may be the most reasonable course for US policy. 
  
                                                          
64 Kennelly, et al. (1991). Somatotropin Treatment of Three Consecutive Lactations of Dairy Cows.  
70th Annual University of Alberta Feeders Day Report, p. 32. 
65 West, J W. (1990). Effects of Bovine Somatotropin on Milk Yield and Composition, Body  
Weight, and Condition Score of Holstein and Jersey Cows. Journal of Dairy Science, 
73(4), p. 1067. 
66 Grandin, T. (2008). A Major Change. Animal Ethics Reader, 2nd Ed. p. 229. 
67 Dohoo, I R. (2003). A Meta-analysis Review of the Effects of Recombinant Bovine  
Somatotropin:  2. Effects on Animal Health, Reproductive Performance, and Culling. 
Canadian Journal of Veterinary Research, 67(4). 
68 Health Canada (1999, January 14). News Release: Health Canada rejects bovine growth  
hormone in Canada. 
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 In addition to the first two categorical changes in practice we have covered, the 
way in which dairy cattle are now kept presents a point of interest to our conversation. 
Although broadly a welfare issue rather than a genetic or production issue, 
environmental factors and their effects on cattle have long been studied and commented 
on in both traditional husbandry and the practice today. Regional variations aside, it was 
generally believed that cows should be pasture fed when seasonally appropriate, and 
barn protection and grain feeding provided during inclement weather or severe cold. The 
reasons given for pasture grazing early on were manifold and ranged from health 
concerns that arose from continued close confinement, the benefits of (some) exercise, 
selective feeding and self-care that cattle exhibit when allowed to graze, and general 
welfare related to an expression of their ―natural behavior‖69. However, even the earliest 
texts make mention of the economic costs associated with providing pasture land 
(including cost of land and the labor and time required to move cattle for milking), 
especially as the herd numbers increased. The sentiment of one early textbook expresses 
this quite succinctly, ―In order to make a dairy profitable the farmer must keep a large 
number of cows in the smallest space possible, and still have ideal conditions, even 
though under unnatural circumstances.‖70  
This view of how cattle should be kept came to dominate the industry to such an 
extent that it has become ridiculous to even consider pasturing cattle in a conventional 
operation. Improvements in nutrition, barn construction, stall formation, waste 
management, and holding contraptions (tie-stalls, circular stalls, free stalls, etc) are all 
                                                          
69 Roberts (1920), Pirtle (1923), Yapp & Nevens (1926), and Anderson (1943) offer some 
perspective on traditional housing of cattle.  




aimed at creating these unnatural but still ―ideal‖ conditions that would keep the overall 
operation economically feasible. This has allowed for unprecedented growth in some 
dairy operations, with several dairies in California and the Pacific Northwest milking 
upwards of 20,000 cows under these systems. Because of this, nutritional science is 
perhaps the most developed area of improvement. Modern nutritionists have formulated 
concentrated rations that are so specific to the needs of a cow‘s milk production that 
farmers can control what mix of feed to give down to the gram.  
 There are several concerns raised in response to this. Many animal scientists 
associate the unnatural environmental constraints imposed on cattle with the problems 
we mentioned earlier. Matthew Lucy, professor of Molecular Endocrinology in the 
department of animal sciences at the University of Missouri, concluded that the decrease 
in reproductive health and efficiency in dairy cattle today can be partially attributed to 
increasing herd size, a greater use of confinement housing, and corresponding labor 
shortages.71 This is due to increased risk of spreading disease, competition over limited 
space and feeding, and general anxiety produced by overcrowding. Cows are naturally 
range animals living in social herds which forage and graze for food. Domestication has 
largely changed this, accompanied by certain genotypic and phenotypic adaptations. 
Tarjei Tennessen, an agrologist at Nova Scotia Agricultural College, has argued that 
while some of the latent urges and behaviors natural to cattle can be overcome by good 
management and effective technological replacements (a diverse and holistic feed, 
allowing for free movement in the barn and some retention of social structures), cows 
must still learn to cope with an unnatural environment.72 Often, however, these 
situations are not always positive and lead in many cases to detrimental welfare results 
                                                          
71 Lucy, M C. (2001). Reproductive Loss in High-Producing Dairy Cattle: Where Will it End?  
Journal of Dairy Science, 84(6), p. 1290. 
72 Tennessen, T. (1991). Can Animals Cope with High-Tech Husbandry?. In High Technology and 
 Animal  Welfare. p. 8. 
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because the environment is so severe as to ―limit the ability of animals to use their coping 
strategies‖73. A long-time advocate of pasture-raising, Bernard Rollin also makes a 
similar point in Farm Animal Welfare, contending that most welfare problems seen in 
the dairy industry spring from confinement systems, and that they should be altogether 
eliminated.74 
 Tennessen believes that major problems related to concentrated ration feeding 
and barn confinement include increased social conflicts, boredom, and other emotional 
issues.75 Although at a cursory glance this seems like a ridiculous critique, there are 
deeper consequences involved. Tennessen explains that eliminating the need to forage 
for food, which often accounts for over a third of a cow‘s normal daily activity when 
allowed to do so, leaves the cow with little else to do in a barren environment than, ―pace 
their cage and chew on bars,‖ as well as increase the likelihood of aggressive conflicts 
over food or territory.76 These competitive and territorial behaviors drastically increase 
with group confinement and can lead to increased incidents of injury or other 
management problems. If we are to conclude that welfare is an important value for the 




1.3 A Shift in Value 
 
 
 The great shift in dairy practices is laden with historical interest and ethical 
concerns. Notions such as animal welfare were never specifically or overtly studied in the 
                                                          
73 Ibid. 
74 Rollin, B. (1995). Farm Animal Welfare: Social, Bioethical, and Research Issues, p. 105. 
75 Tennessen, T. (1991). Can Animals Cope with High-Tech Husbandry?. In High Technology and 
 Animal  Welfare. p. 9. 
76 Ibid. 8. 
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early history of the field, but were most often assumed to be an integral part of what it 
meant to be a successful farmer. As a result, when dairying became industrialized, many 
of these assumed values were forgotten or, more correctly, subsumed under the more 
pressing economic ones. This transition of values is far less straightforward than the 
mechanical transition of the industry and resists quantification like the economic shifts it 
has seen, with complex results.  
 It would be helpful to reiterate our definition of husbandry: to enter into a 
contractual and symbiotic relationship with the animal, constituting substantial care in 
return for production of food. In the early stages of the shift in dairy practice, welfare of 
the animal was still a priority. This symbiotic valuing of the animal is still very much 
alive in some aspects of dairy farming, though it always has been, and is still, measured 
in terms of productivity77. High production, historically, was always and only seen in 
conjunction with good welfare for the animal. As a result, proper management taught 
farmers that welfare was reducible to productivity. It was in collapsing these two 
measurement scales that the first ethical error took place, and where we see the reason 
certain values have been subjugated to others. More fundamentally than an ethical 
mistake, this kind of reduction is a simple error in logic. The proposition that ―all A‘s are 
B‘s‖ is not the same as ―all B‘s are A‘s‖. The fact that all cows are mammals does not 
mean that all mammals are cows. The fact that good welfare conditions in dairy lead to 
generally high production rates does not mean that high production rates result in 
satisfactory welfare conditions. 
Additionally, the ubiquitous use of new technologies has altered the ―constant 
conjunction‖ (to use a Humean notion) of productivity and welfare even when correctly 
                                                          
77 My experience on a small, ―mom and pop‖ 50-cow dairy in Maine one summer proved this. 
Each cow was named and taken care of on an individual basis. A sick cow was a momentous 
occasion, and taken care of even at high cost to the farmer. From conversations with other nearby 
farmers, this level of intimacy and concern is standard practice for farms of that size. 
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construed. New technologies were aimed at decreasing many of the costs of dairying: 
labor was reduced through more efficient milking machines and feeding machines, 
traditional veterinary care was replaced by antibiotics and preventative medicine, 
pasturing and open-spaces were made inefficient with ―better‖ feeding and barn systems, 
allowing for more cows to be kept in less space, and new breeding techniques and 
selected traits eliminated the need for excess care given to low-producers78. However, as 
we have seen, this has not necessarily led to high standards of animal welfare; often it 
has been the obverse. 
 To review: the dairyman can now produce more milk with less labor (or 
interaction with individual cows), less land, and less time addressing low-producers. The 
result is a system that can support an incredible number of mostly barn-confined cows 
that are maintained based on mechanized feed and production schedules, with little 
deviation. The level of advanced management skills required to maintain such a large 
operation is astounding. The timing and infrastructure needed to milk (twice daily) 
thousands of cattle alone requires an immense level of efficiency, never mind juggling 
feed requirements, veterinary needs, waste removal, and seasonal factors79. As the 
farmer automates or replaces traditional ―hands on‖ practices, the call to take an active 
role in ensuring the wellbeing of an individual animal becomes nearly impossible to 
address. It is now apparent that despite dramatic increases in productivity, the condition 
of the cow is not thereby assured. 
                                                          
78 As outlined in the same 1943 husbandry text cited earlier, ―improved management and 
breeding practices‖ called for immediate culling of all low-producing cows as replacement costs 
were lower than continuing to feed the cow hoping for higher production (Anderson, 268). This 
suggests that it was a new practice that must replace older methods. 
79 Many modern dairies in California house an excess of 20,000 head in several loafing barns of 
2,000+ cows that are milked by rotating machines in adjacent parlors and fed in bulk stalls. 
Maddox Dairy (one such operation) employs ―50-99‖ people (including management) according 
to their public business profile. Technically, that is ―only‖ around 300 cows per employee to tend 
to; however it is more likely that each employee works in an industrial system where each person 
only occupies one arena (feed, maintenance, milk parlor operation, etc). 
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 Furthermore, the dramatic increase in production achieved by the dairy industry 
has not necessarily been economically intelligent, apart from hurting the welfare of the 
animal. Market pressures are constantly in flux, and simple economic theory 
demonstrates that the amount of goods in a market has a great impact on the price and 
profit of such goods. Currently, the market is flooded with excess milk because of the 
high production in the dairy industry. This means a great loss for the farmers because 
not only are they losing money increasing production unnecessarily—which means more, 
expensive feed, expensive bST treatments, etc.—but they are also reducing their profits 
as the price of milk falls to reflect the supply and demand balance. Economists call this 
the ―point of diminishing returns.‖ A heedless practice of increasing milk production 
without limit is therefore economically irrational. Typically, the industry has taken the 
stance that in every case when stronger moral values (animal welfare, etc.) are imposed, 
efficiency and economic success decreases; a kind of negative slope relationship. Based 
on my previous discussion, this notion is being called into question. Moral values may 
very well be a kind of economic insurance for the dairy industry in addition to making it 
a stronger ethical organization.  
 From an outside perspective, the present state of the dairy industry is a far cry 
from the ―Good Dairyman‖ of Yapp and Neven as outlined earlier, but it is not entirely 
so. Valuing the agricultural lifestyle and welfare of the cows, and being a ―good 
dairymen‖ are still prioritized; however the old measuring stick (high production = good 
welfare) has been rendered obsolete. Growing scientific evidence suggests that the past 
100 years of intensive, trait selective breeding for production, increased use of growth 
hormones and drugs that funnel digestive nutrients to the mammary system, and cattle 
holding systems that limit physical exercise, have resulted in a constitutionally weak cow 
with plummeting genetic, and thus physical, resilience—despite record high, short-term 
productivity. The future of the cow is uncertain, and it would seem that the system as 
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such is failing. These results show a significant conflict in values, and therefore fall under 
the auspices of the philosopher to examine. The repercussions of this failure extend into 
economic, political, and social fields, with ethical issues pervasive throughout. Having 
now an adequate understanding of the issues, and having defined the relevant values and 
mechanisms that precipitated the present situation, a critical look at the competing 
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Based on the evidence given in the previous chapter, I have suggested that many 
of the more difficult problems facing dairy, including health failures in cattle and the 
overall decline in dairy farm viability, are the byproduct of reducing the traditional 
measurement of acceptable animal welfare to the animal‘s production ability. Writ large, 
this translates as an industry error that has reduced what it means to have a successful 
dairy industry to measures of short-term economic yield and profit. In fact, I will 
contend that almost every ethical issue facing the dairy industry, and arguably 
agriculture in general, can be characterized as a problem of reducibility. This is a kind of 
economic calculus for ethical acceptability, and is used universally by the industry to 
determine most of its decisions. It is my argument that this way of making industry 
decisions, especially in agriculture, is not robust enough to account for animal welfare, or 
even the long-term viability of single operations, and is thus ethically unacceptable. If 
the means by which a group makes decisions cannot ensure that the most important 
ethical concerns are sufficiently addressed, then that group is sure to be morally 
deficient. I return here to my original axial concerns and argue that it is in reducing, and 
thereby ignoring, non-economic value judgments and moral obligations out of 
preference for the economic ―bottom line‖ where we find significant cause to question 
the efficacy of animal agriculture.  
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Agriculture, although now a global industry, is by virtue of its work and 
relationship to the society of which it is a part, a provider of a necessary social good. As 
such, it is inherently different from other industries, especially from the more 
mechanistic ones that it attempts to emulate. Providers of necessary social goods, e.g. 
health care, education, scientific research, etc., are held to much higher ethical standards 
because of the intimacy of their relationship to society. These standards are generally 
seen as being necessary, even in the face of higher economic costs and financial burdens 
it requires to enforce them.  Agriculture not only produces necessary social goods, but 
behind their production they also rely implicitly on living beings who have a significant 
and important moral standing. Dairy cattle, as will be argued presently, are objects of 
moral concern making our relationship with them vested with very real moral 
obligations. Agriculture, including animal agriculture and thus dairy, is not fulfilling this 
obligation, nor is it being regulated in a way that would ensure this responsibility is met. 
I believe this exception is a fundamental mistake of our society, and represents the real-
world translation of my original, although theoretical, axial concern of reducibility. 
However, before we can dive into a discussion of moral economic and social 
theory, we must make an argument for the importance and relevance of animal welfare 
for its own sake as a requisite concern for agriculture. Many argue that ensuring the 
wellbeing of farm animals should be a requirement beyond economic foresight or 
political accountability, and should be done because the animal deserves our 
consideration and protection. This has been a significant assumption so far in our 
discussion, and can now be adequately addressed. 
 Without spilling too much ink unnecessarily reviewing the philosophical 
literature on the subject, I hope in the following sections to outline why we have this 
responsibility, and relate it to my original theoretical concerns. I will do this through a 
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progressive argument with three main premises and a conclusion: (Premise 1) Animal 
welfare is morally relevant and necessary in animal agriculture; (Premise 2) If animal 
welfare is ignored, the agriculture industry will be forced to comply with social pressures, 
resulting in legal constraints that limit the autonomy necessary for successful 
agriculture; (Premise 3) Allowing an economic ideology to dictate the future actions of 
animal agricultural practices precludes the industry‘s ability to account for moral 
obligations such as animal welfare; and finally (Conclusion) The dairy industry must 
change on ethical grounds. Again, if we can show that the dairy industry is subject to 
premises (1)-(3), we should conclude that it is more similar to social-wellbeing 
operations such as healthcare or education, rather than purely mechanistic industries 
like automobile or widget manufacturing. Therefore, such an industry must be subject to 
greater ethical standards than those other counterparts. Furthermore, if the dairy 
industry continues to allow economic pressures to set its goals, these questions of value 
and moral obligation will be ignored and the industry will continue to suffer, being even 
further laden with legal constrictions. Put simply, whether or not the industry takes 
initiative to move toward moral acceptability, it will be forced to change through external 
pressures that may cause a broken industry to struggle even more. It is important to 
emphasize that the conclusions of this discussion are applicable to animal agriculture in 
general, not just for dairy—although it is a paradigm case80. Following this chapter, I will 
consider possible solutions to these issues and competing arguments. 
 
                                                          
80 For the remainder of this chapter, excepting those instances where the mention of dairy cattle 
or the dairy industry serves as an important distinction from other agriculture animals or 
production types, I will subsume ―dairy cow‖ or ―dairy industry‖ under the general term ―animal‖ 
or ―animal agriculture‖ as the arguments forthcoming apply equally to all cases of animal 
agriculture. This will hopefully lessen any confusion or nuisance while reading for both the reader 
and the author. 
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I have given sufficient evidence to demonstrate that neglecting the welfare of 
cattle in dairy production has and will continue to lead to negative economic and farmer-
relative consequences; but what about ensuring the welfare of the animal for its own 
sake? Given enough time and resources, animal scientists could possibly breed a beast 
that would be able to sustain extreme levels of production and environmental strain 
without the economic costs presently accompanying the practice. This does not, 
however, answer a more basic ethical concern that is attached to the original worry, i.e. 
the moral standing of animals. This has been a fairly unworked problem for philosophy, 
in part because the belief that animals exist solely for the pleasure and sustenance of 
humans has long dominated traditional Western thought from Biblical times onward. 
Most arguments for this view share a common premise that animals are unconscious and 
are more like machines than living beings, incapable of being harmed. Descartes‘ 
notorious position on the cognitive emptiness of animals and later the behaviorist school 
of modern psychology and their similar theory certainly reinforced the opinion that 
animals are merely instruments at our disposal.81  
If this is true, there is no place for ethical consideration of the wellbeing of 
animals beyond our own self-interested concerns. Over the past three decades, however, 
there has been a growing awareness that animals possess far more complex cognitive 
lives than was previously believed, calling into question the historical precedent. In 
ethical theory this has awakened a debate over whether or not animals should be 
counted as ―objects of moral concern‖ and whether ensuring their wellbeing should be a 
                                                          
81 For a full exegesis, q.v. Rollin, B. (2007). Animal Mind: Science, Philosophy, and Ethics. The  
Journal of Ethics, 11(3), 253-274. 
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moral obligation. I think it would be helpful here to consider the question of whether 
animals are objects of moral concern fully. If they are, it would then give even more 
reason to improve the welfare of animals in agriculture beyond the economic effects it 
has on the farm industry—with substantial social implications.  
First of all, we must understand what it means to talk at all about ―an object of 
moral concern.‖ A brief explanation of the concept is necessary. The statement itself 
already supposes a relation between two things; fundamentally, there can be no ―object‖ 
at all without a referent, even more so when that object elicits concern. An ―object‖ 
cannot exist in a vacuum because simply by counting it as a singular thing we already 
delimit it from other objects, giving it boundaries. At the very least, we must separate it 
from the point of reference that defines it, or the observer. Therefore statements, e.g. 
―That is a tree,‖ always already suppose an observer or referent in addition to the object. 
This is even more clearly so when we speak of an object of moral concern. What has 
―concern‖ if not another object/person that can be concerned about such things? Moral 
considerations are thus relational at their base and even more importantly directional in 
that the concerned party is concerned for an object.  
My point in this quasi-Kantian exposition is to make the case that, when 
considering whether or not animals count as objects of moral concern, we must first 
define both sides of the relationship: what constitutes such an object, and what it means 
for a person to have ―moral concern.‖ The latter variable is slightly less complicated. In 
discussing any object of moral concern, we are already putting ourselves and our 
capacity to act morally into the discussion. What this means is that there is something 
about a ―moral object‖ that elicits (or should elicit) a special kind of concern from us. 
Infanticide, rape, and other unquestionably heinous acts are considered such because 
they are actions which harm objects of moral concern—we condemn the acts because we 
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have the ability both to have concern for the suffering parties, and because we can see 
that such suffering is in some sense ―wrong.‖ If someone rapes a rock (were such a thing 
possible), there would be little reason to condemn the act because the affected object 
does not concern us morally. Typically, philosophers have called those with the capacity 
for moral concern and an understanding of right and wrong ―moral agents.‖  
Aristotle may have been the first Western philosopher to define what it means to 
be a moral agent and provides a compellingly simple account of it. In the Nicomachean 
Ethics, chapter III. §1-5, Aristotle spends a great deal of time on this matter, concluding 
that of the beings which act voluntarily (including most animals, although not for 
Aristotle) and thus count as agents, only a certain kind qualifies as a moral agent. A 
moral agent is one that is subject to ascriptions of responsibility and can be properly 
praised or blamed for her actions. This requires not only that she can act voluntarily (the 
cause of her actions are not all from external influences), but that she has the capacity to 
understand what is ―good‖ and then decide to act in a certain way. Defined further, this 
decision is born of a particular kind of desire resulting from deliberation, one that 
expresses the agent's conception of what is good.82 Obviously, how we define what is 
―good‖ makes a difference, but there is strong reason include concern for others in this 
category. Accounting for all of the elements in this definition supposes a certain level of 
cognitive ability for an agent to be properly labeled as a Moral Agent. 
The second variable is more difficult to define, as an object of moral concern has 
several characteristics. Broadly, an object is considered morally relevant if one‘s actions 
toward it can be judged on moral criterion, i.e. right or wrong, good or bad, just or 
unjust, etc. This is only a definition from the perspective of the moral agent, however, 
and considering the question from the perspective of the object itself offers other 
                                                          
82 Aristotle. (1985). The Nicomachean Ethics. Terence Irwin (trans.), § 1111b5-1113b3. 
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characteristics. Chief among them is that it can suffer or flourish in a way that matters to 
it (i.e. it has the cognitive ability to experience these and is a significant motivator of its 
behavior). Simply put, such an object cares what happens to it. Whether or not it 
possesses moral agency, the fact that it can suffer or flourish in a way that self-
referentially matters defines it as an object that should elicit concern from other moral 
agents. This is why rock-rape does not elicit moral condemnation—the rock cannot 
suffer, nor does it have the ability to care about what happens to it, making any such 
condemnation non sequitur. Deeming what constitutes a right or wrong action toward a 
true object of moral concern must be situationally evaluated, but the fact that one‘s 
actions toward it carry moral weight stems from its capacity to suffer or flourish in 
response to one‘s actions.  
This is shown explicitly in Bernard Rollin‘s article ―Reasonable Partiality and 
Animal Ethics‖ (2005) when he explains the moral significance of why we should respect 
the interests of beings capable of suffering. He does so in terms of the Kantian ‗locus of 
moral attention‘ criterion for those beings which are ends in themselves versus merely a 
means to an end. A being is a locus of moral attention, according to Kant, if what is done 
to her matters to her—that she values her own life constitutes her moral standing as 
valuable in her own right. Rollin characterizes the moral standing of his plumber in a 
similar way, ―Built into him is the positive and negative valuing of what is done to him, 
such valuing is intrinsic (built into him), rather than merely a result of how well he 
serves me or how much or how little I value his usefulness to me (his instrumental 
value). Thus, he is an "end in himself."83 Later on, Rollin elaborates on this further, 
 ―Surely any sentient or conscious being has states that matter to it in a positive 
or negative way - pleasure matters to an animal in a positive way, pain or fear in a 
                                                          




negative way. Since it can value what happens to it, it has intrinsic value. Given 
the logic of morality, we should extend our moral attention to those states that 
matter to it when our actions affect that being.‖84 
 
 
With this perspective as a guiding point, we can consider how this could be used 
in evaluating a proper attitude toward animals. In order for animals to count as objects 
of moral concern, it will require that we provide evidence for their cognitive ability to 
suffer and flourish and also to care about what happens to it. Until quite recently, it was 
an accepted ―scientific fact‖ that animals were incapable of experiencing pain and were 
more like machines or bundles of instinctual, involuntary behaviors, making any attempt 
at defining an animal ethic a laughable endeavor from the start. However, the staggering 
amount of research and academic literature that has since provided evidence to the 
contrary (and the acceptance of animal cruelty laws like the one cited earlier) makes this 
an antediluvian view and deserving of nothing more than our collective disdain for its 
conclusions85. Given these conclusions (and common sense) that suggest the existence of 
greater animal consciousness, there is sufficient cause to conclude that most animals 
count as objects of moral concern. This means that animals can suffer and flourish and 
that these experiences matter to them. As such, they should elicit concern in moral 
agents and obligate these agents to consider actions against them as morally relevant. 
However, even if one accepts that animals are objects of moral concern, one could 
still argue that our concern for them is far outweighed by our concern for ourselves and 
our need to use them for food. Any slight wrong committed by causing an animal to 
suffer is of less importance than the good created by feeding ourselves. This is effectively 
the argument that the animal agriculture industry uses in defending its own practices 
                                                          
84 Ibid. 
85 Q.v.: Bateson, P. (1991). Assessment of Pain in Animals. Animal Behaviour, 42(5), 827-839; for 




(although they usually don‘t acknowledge that the animals suffer at all). The 
continuation of such a view allows the industry to maintain their present M.O. and avoid 
making any progress in improving animal welfare. There are several reasons the industry 
should abandon this view, and considering general philosophical positions on cruelty as 
well as arguments from classic ethical theories on proper animal use will hopefully show 
this. 
A common critique by many animal activists in response to evidence showing 
animals suffering overwhelming pain and disfigurement under agricultural systems, is to 
condemn this as extreme, unnecessary suffering and therefore cruel and unacceptable86. 
The truth or falsity of this belief is of secondary concern for me in this section. I am more 
interested in what constitutes the perceived connection between wrongness and the 
occurrence of extreme, unnecessary animal suffering.  
As a preliminary step in my explanation, I need to define what counts as cruelty. 
Deciding what constitutes this will never escape academic controversy, so I will use the 
official Colorado State laws on animal cruelty to provide a benchmark on which to base 
further discussion. To quote the law: 
―A person commits cruelty to animals if he or she knowingly, recklessly, or with 
criminal negligence overdrives, overloads, overworks, torments, deprives of 
necessary sustenance, unnecessarily or cruelly beats, allows to be housed in a 
manner that results in chronic or repeated serious physical harm… or otherwise 
mistreats or neglects any animal…‖87 
 
 
Serious physical harm is defined by the law as: ―(a) Any physical harm that carries a 
substantial risk of death; (b) Any physical harm that causes permanent maiming or that 
                                                          
86 Proliferation of the inflammatory images found on many PETA or HSUS publications about the 
treatment of animals in agriculture has come to dominate the work of many animal activists. 
87 Colorado State Law (2005): Title 18. Criminal Code. Article 9. Offenses Against Public Peace,  
Order, and Decency. Part 2. Cruelty to Animals § 18-9-201. 
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involves some temporary, substantial maiming; or (c) Any physical harm that causes 
acute pain of a duration that results in substantial suffering.‖88 The appropriateness of 
this law for our purposes has not been missed and will be the subject of later reflection. I 
will also take the liberty of concluding that pain, separated from any further 
consequences, is an experience that is generally avoided by living things capable of 
feeling it—and thus a ―negative‖ and even ―bad‖ experience, despite the evolutionary 
benefits associated with pain. 
Common sense, and nearly every ethical theory, would tell us that causing 
extreme and unnecessary pain to a person is unacceptable and constitutes abuse. 
Different theories offer different reasons for why this is an acceptable conclusion, but 
most would agree that it is simply because causing an innocent to suffer is wrong—there 
is something definitively abhorrent about it. Can we make an analogous conclusion for 
causing the same harm in non-human animals89? And if so, what are the possible 
conditions under which it would be acceptable to inflict this harm?  
Equating the moral implications of causing human versus animal pain is a 
complex task that is not without controversy, but one that is necessary if we are to say 
anything with confidence about the moral relevance of animal welfare in agriculture. 
Even with the scientific advances that demonstrated rudimentary animal sentience, 
there is still a large burden of proof to show that they have the requisite cognitive 
abilities to count as moral objects.90 Proving that animals feel pain was only the first 
hurdle. For Tom Regan, philosopher and animal ethicist, the mental abilities of a living 
being, insofar as they are capable of a number of morally relevant capacities, establishes 
                                                          
88 Ibid. For the full statute, q.v. appendix 1. 
89 Hereafter called ―animals.‖ 
90 Q.v., Bateson, P. (1991). Assessment of Pain in Animals. Animal Behaviour, 42(5), 827-839.  
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its moral standing.91 These capacities include: an ability to feel pleasure or pain, to have 
desires, preferences, or memory, to have a sense of the future, and even the ability to 
have beliefs, to speak, or to reason.  
In his essay, ―The Case for Animal Rights,‖ (2008) Regan delineates sentient 
beings into two categories: ―moral agents‖ and ―moral patients.‖ Improving on Aristotle‘s 
definition, Regan defines moral agents as, ―individuals who have a variety of 
sophisticated abilities, including in particular the ability to bring impartial moral 
principles to bear on the determination of what ought to be done,‖92 and to then choose 
to act in the right or wrong way as they define it. This ability, he continues, allows them 
to be held morally accountable for their actions. Moral patients, on the other hand, ―lack 
the prerequisites that would enable them to control their own behavior in ways that 
would make them morally accountable for what they do‖ yet still possess a level of 
sentience (can experience pleasure/pain) and some of the other capacities mentioned 
previously.93 Many animals, and certainly all animals in common agriculture, would 
therefore fall into the moral patient category, as well as certain humans who are deficient 
for one reason or another (infants, the mentally handicapped, and the enfeebled are 
some examples). These individuals who are incapable of acting morally themselves are 
still considered morally relevant because they can be, according to Regan, involved or 
―on the receiving end of the right or wrong acts of moral agents‖ unlike insentient 
objects.94 
This distinction is important for our discussion because it effectively defines 
animals as being innocent (incapable of doing wrong or right), so that causing harm to 
                                                          
91 Regan, T. (2008). The Case for Animal Rights. Animal Ethics Reader, 2nd Edition, p. 20. 





an animal is equal to harming an infant, mentally handicapped, or otherwise enfeebled 
person, insofar as they are all instances of moral patients. I admit that this is an extreme 
conclusion and perhaps even verges on an ―appeal to pity‖ fallacy. What is important, 
however, is that it provides an interesting argument for defining the moral status of 
animals. From this perspective, one can conclude that while the moral relationship 
between a moral agent and a moral patient is not reciprocal as it would be between two 
moral agents, right or wrong acts themselves still apply to both categories and can be 
evaluated as such. 
I agree with Regan that to some extent these same conclusions hold for causing 
pain to animals as they do for causing pain to humans. Animal cruelty is an extreme case 
of this, defined by our causing extreme and unnecessary pain conditions to an animal—
exactly what many animal activists accuse animal agriculture of. The reaction to 
instances of animal cruelty and wanton abuse is predictably one of disgust and 
abhorrence—hence the activists groups‘ utilization of such images so frequently. As 
further evidence, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) 
characterizes animal abuse and cruelty as an indicator of Antisocial Personality Disorder, 
known colloquially as psychopathy95. This basic revulsion can be understood as a 
symptom of our commonly held value system that says cruelty in any form is, simply, 
bad. Not only that, but the notion that suffering is the evil—if forced to pick just one—to 
be avoided or alleviated, is common in some of the important, classic ethical traditions.  
                                                          
95 Pulled directly from the DSM IV: ―Antisocial Personality Disorder, Diagnostic Features: ―The 
essential feature of Antisocial Personality Disorder is a pervasive pattern of disregard for, and 
violation of, the rights of others…early-sign behaviors in youths include: aggression and abuse to 
people and animals, destruction of property, deceitfulness or theft, or serious violation of rules.‖  
American Psychiatric Association (1994). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, Fourth Ed., p. 646. 
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For animal agriculture to prove that their practices do not fall into this category, 
the industry must show that it does not commit the acts prohibited by Colorado State 
law, or that there is sufficient and overriding reasons to warrant such treatment. Based 
on the conclusions of the previous chapter of this project, these conditions cannot be 
conscionably met. To be sure, the purpose of this section is not to accuse agriculture of 
being purposefully cruel or abusive to animals. My earlier discussion on what constitutes 
a ―good dairyman‖ and the prevalence of such farmers should be referenced for my 
personal sentiments on the matter. In fact, I would argue that many of the current 
practices under attack have their origins in more benign motivations designed to benefit 
the agriculture community. Rather, to prove a point necessary for my argument that 
animal welfare must occupy a greater place in agriculture, I want to elaborate on the 
reasons behind why the value judgment, ―causing unnecessary suffering [to an animal] is 
inherently bad,‖ is generally acceptable.  
It would be worthwhile to elaborate on the apparent connection between 
wrongness and causing animal pain, focusing primarily on the pain or suffering of the 
animal as mattering to it, and any ensuing obligations the moral agent has in her 
treatment of agricultural animals96. One tool available to philosophers in determining 
the source of value judgments is to turn the impersonal or universal judgment under 
scrutiny into a personal one and then slowly build back up to a universal claim based on 
the answers found. In our case, pulling loosely from Bernard Rollin‘s examples on the 
subject, I can ask why I do not want to be the victim of cruel actions or generally to suffer 
                                                          
96 There exists copious literature on the subject in terms of different relationships humans have 
with animals; for example, wildlife, zoo animals, companion pets, and animals used in research. I 
am purposely avoiding any further mention of these. Besides the fact that the scope of the present 
project is only concerned with animal agriculture, including these other variations would 
unnecessarily complicate the more basic concerns at hand and introduce distinctions that are not 
relevant to the argument I wish to put forward. These other topics can be examined further in 
Armstrong, S. & Botzler, R. (2008). The Animal Ethics Reader. Routledge Publishers, NY. 
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at all97. My answer is that I value my wellbeing, and therefore the pain I experience 
matters to me. Note that this is a negative kind of ―mattering,‖ where the removal of a 
certain experience is desired. I respond, almost instinctually, to painful circumstances by 
trying to avoid or escape that which is causing me pain. The more painful the experience, 
the more excited this reaction becomes, even to the point of hysteria. Why else would 
this response be so emphatic except that the elimination of suffering is important to me? 
No further reason is needed to explain why I want to eliminate my suffering and why I 
might claim that the person causing such pain is morally reprehensible for doing so. 
Likewise, when observing another person treated cruelly, I am able to 
empathize98 with her in her avoidance behavior because I can understand what it would 
mean to suffer in that sense and would behave similarly myself. By comparing my own 
experiences with her avoidance behavior and reaction to suffering (including any 
confirmations she may give me directly), I can perceive that her pain matters 
significantly and is considered negative to her. Moving further up the impersonal chain, 
if I were confronted with a situation where I could treat another person cruelly, I may 
hesitate to do so because of the same conclusions I came to in empathizing with the 
suffering person—I acknowledge that the person has the capacity to suffer and that this 
matters negatively to that person. Following the logic of my own experience, I would 
have to hold myself culpable for causing this person pain if I chose to do so. It is easy to 
see how this principle can become more standardized into the original claim, ―causing 
                                                          
97 Q.v., Animal Rights and Human Morality (2006), ―Reasonable Partiality and Animal Ethics‖ 
(2005), and Farm Animal Welfare (1995). 
98 Empathy is a rich philosophical term and the use of it here would benefit from a technical 
definition. The word originates from the Greek empatheia, literally co-pathos or co-emotion—
meaning a shared emotion. I find, however, that the German version of Einfühlen, literally ―a 
touch/feeling‖ or to be touched presumably by witnessing another‘s mind, more closely captures 
how we understand the experience. It is really more of an intuition of a feeling we perceive in the 
other person that we can barely touch, but that is often true. This capacity is remarkable and not 
limited to humans; anyone with a companion animal can tell you their pet knows when they are 
sad by the change in the pet‘s behavior. This anecdote lends further strength to the idea that we 
can empathize with an animal‘s pain. 
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unnecessary suffering is bad.‖ Calling a cruel action ―wrong‖ or ―bad‖ is simply 
shorthand for the fact that pain and suffering matters negatively to the people who 
experience it. 
If our empathy arises from our ability to correctly (or nearly so) interpret the 
behaviors of others based on our own self-knowledge, then it seems a similar proof could 
follow in the case of the suffering of animals, even though they are not moral agents in 
the Regan sense. When we observe a cow bellow, flinch, and buck when jabbed in the 
rear by an electrical cattle prod (a common practice in the industry to herd cattle along a 
chute), we can confidently say that the experience negatively matters for the cow. If this 
is true, then along with our ability to recognize the pain of the animal, we should be able 
to empathize with it, and therefore reasonably ―understand,‖ even if only by our own 
anthropocentric terms, the experience of the animal. Those avoidance behaviors are 
probably not dissimilar from our own were we to find ourselves in the same situation. 
We can conclude, therefore, that pain matters to the animal in much the same way that 
pain matters to humans, and thus carries the same moral value and obligations. It is not 
a great leap to determine from this that the same reasons that explain the wrongness of 
causing extreme and unnecessary pain in a human apply to animals—perhaps even 
doubly so as they are moral patients and not moral agents, and thus dependent upon 
humans in a significant way.  
With these tools at our disposal, we can now examine a selection of common 
ethical theories that address our problem. Given the amount of evidence provided earlier 
on the diminished welfare of dairy cattle resulting from industrial practices, it must be 
concluded that the industry is perpetuating some cruel-like conditions for the animals. 
Although not a universally cruel system, the presence of any amount of excessive and 
unnecessary pain is morally wrong and indefensible. A brief look at Utilitarian theories, 
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Rights approaches, and Virtue ethics on this topic will help to address our proposition. 
While each position has its own shortcomings, and thus not to be taken as infallible, they 
all show an important perspective on the need for greater animal welfare conditions in 
agriculture and reinforce the need for the industry to take it seriously.  
 





The Utilitarian arguments which contend that the agriculture industry needs to 
account for animal welfare are perhaps the most prevalent in academic circles and 
popular culture at this time. This is due in overwhelming part to the work of Peter Singer 
and the acceptance of his ethical theories into the dogma of the largest animal activist 
groups such as People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) and the Humane 
Society of the United States (HSUS). As such, it is his arguments on animal welfare in 
agriculture that I will use as a paradigm example for the Utilitarian approach. 
Singer‘s most famous approach towards animal ethics relies heavily on his 
conception of the ―principle of equality‖ which he defines simply as ―the nature of the 
principal of equal consideration of interests.‖99 The argument goes, pulling from the now 
cliché Bentham quote,100 that moral concern for the interests of a living thing should not 
to be limited by any other characteristic (including species, intelligence or rational 
capacities) than its ability to suffer. Singer explains that ―The capacity for suffering and 
enjoying things is a prerequisite for having interests at all,‖ and that if a creature can 
suffer then ―there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into 
                                                          
99 Singer, P. (2008). Practical Ethics. Animal Ethics Reader, 2nd Edition, p. 36. 
100 ―The question is not, Can [animals] reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?‖ 
Bentham, J. (1789). The Principles of Morals and Legislation. Oxford Press. London 
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consideration."101 His argument confronts the notion that non-human animals cannot be 
objects of moral concern because they are of a different species. Singer points out that 
the main reason for having this ―speciesism‖ is because there is supposedly a natural 
characteristic which all humans share equally and which separates us morally from other 
creatures. However, as he shows, there is so much diversity in cognitive ability, 
rationality, dignity, and other supposed reasons for considering humans as special 
objects of moral concern that it would exclude many humans from this category. Those 
among us with mental handicaps, who are infants, or otherwise enfeebled, are perhaps 
far more cognitively weak than many of the higher mammals that are generally excluded 
from moral standing, and therefore lack these ―special features‖ attributed universally to 
humans. Singer correctly exposes the logical mistake this entails when those higher 
animals are excluded and enfeebled humans included. Making such special conditions 
for moral standing are, for Singer, as arbitrary as racial profiling or religious 
discrimination. Not only does Singer hold that all beings who suffer require our moral 
consideration under his principle, but that giving greater weight to the interests of one 
set of beings (however defined) over another that suffer equally violates our moral 
obligations. Suffering is suffering, and ―pains of the same intensity and duration are 
equally bad, whether felt by humans or animals.‖102 This means, effectively, that the 
human tendency to value its own kind‘s suffering over that of other animals, if the level 
of suffering is determined to be equal, is morally indefensible.  
Generally, Singer‘s utilitarianism is based upon the singular value that suffering 
is morally bad and the right thing to do is always to prevent or relieve it whenever it is 
encountered. The obverse naturally follows, where happiness is the moral good to be 
maximized whenever possible. Exception is given only to situations where the degree of 
                                                          
101 Singer, P. (2008). Practical Ethics. Animal Ethics Reader, 2nd Edition, p. 37. 
102 Ibid. 38. 
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suffering differs between two individuals, and in such cases more consideration is 
required to be given to the individual or group experiencing with greater suffering. It is 
an agent-neutral, maximizing utilitarianism which borders on perfectionism—allowing 
for few exceptions to that general rule.  
Even from this brief description of Singer‘s philosophical approach, one can 
anticipate his view on animal agriculture. His concern for food animals is that their 
suffering, caused by life in factory or modern operations, far outweighs the benefits 
experienced by the humans who consume them or their products. Animal food products 
are technically unnecessary for the continued healthy existence of most people, making 
them luxury goods desired only for the taste. In order to remain consistent with his 
principle of equality, Singer must denounce any case where the major interests of one 
group (the extreme and unnecessary suffering of animals) are sacrificed for the minor 
interests of another (the pleasure humans derive from taste).103 Singer consistently 
compares the confinement of agricultural animals in feed lots to the human slave trade 
as being roughly equal in terms of the suffering produced; taken to its extreme, his 
principle advocates for animal liberation when the suffering of the animal in captivity is 
greater than it would be if it wasn‘t in captivity. 
To his credit, he is quick to point out that acceptable farming practices such as 
small-scale operations or pain-free slaughterhouses that allow for new animals to live 
because of the space created by the death, are theoretically acceptable but practically 
impossible.104 However, if we revisit the conditions required of a good ethical theory 
from page two of this essay: that it must necessarily be pragmatic, situated in the present 
time and culture, and able to lend itself to real-world application, we find that Singer‘s 
                                                          
103 Ibid. 39. 
104 Ibid. 40. 
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approach is lacking. Despite this crippling weakness, one of the main strengths that I 
perceive in his argument is that he makes a compelling case for why it is morally 
indefensible to discount the suffering or wellbeing of an animal, except in special cases 
where greater suffering is thereby avoided. Finding a rational argument against this view 
becomes quite difficult if it is to be agreed that suffering is fundamentally bad. 
Additionally, the fact that humans do not require animal products for a healthy existence 
strikes a blow at the animal agriculture industry because it calls into question the 
reasons behind the industry‘s push to expand without limit as it has the past 100 years. If 
it is only an economic reason nested in American tradition, and not the promotion of a 
―healthy product‖ or to ―feed the world‖ as the industry claims, then the comparison to 
human slavery grows slightly stronger. It also questions the position that human benefits 
outweigh animal suffering. 
If animal agriculture hopes to adequately defend itself from Singer‘s critiques, it 
must find a way to address the problems of animal suffering which permeate the 
industry to an extent that satisfies some of these concerns.  
 





 We have already discussed the position of Tom Regan on the moral position of 
animals; his related views on the rights of animals further extend his influence on 
academia and philosophical positions on the ethical use of animals. His overall 
conclusion on the matter is that all moral agents and moral patients have ―certain basic 
moral rights, including in particular the fundamental right to be treated with the respect 
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that, as possessors of inherent value, they are due as a matter of strict justice.‖105 He 
argues that because animals count as moral patients, meaning they possess specific 
advanced cognitive abilities, they are also what he calls a ―subject-of-a-life.‖ This is 
defined as beings whose lives are ―better or worse for them, logically independently of 
the utility they have for others and logically independently of their being the object of the 
interests of others.‖106 This is quite similar to the Kantian principle of being an ―end in 
itself‖ or being ―inherently valuable.‖ In fact, Regan holds that being a subject-of-a-life is 
the same as being considered inherently valuable. He also makes the claim that it is this 
inherent value which explains why we have direct duties to respect people and create 
―rights‖ or laws to ensure we continue to ―treat those individuals who have inherent 
value in ways that respect their inherent value.‖107 Because Regan believes that being a 
subject-of-a-life and thus having inherent value is a categorical variable (or universally 
applicable with no degree of application: either one is inherently valuable, or one isn’t), 
we are bound by justice to treat everything that has inherent value with the same 
consideration and respect. Therefore the most basic rights we extend to humans, i.e. the 
right not to be harmed, to live a life in line with our own flourishing, etc., must also be 
extended to animals. In Regan‘s own words, ―It is not an act of kindness to treat animals 
respectfully. It is an act of justice.‖108 
 Regan‘s position on animal agriculture, based on this argument, comes to the 
same basic conclusion as Peter Singer‘s insofar as he argues for animal liberation. 
However, Regan extends this conclusion further and advocates for the total dissolution 
of animal agriculture because it violates the animal‘s basic rights. We enter into a 
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contractual-like relationship with animals in agriculture; however the terms of this 
contract are rather severe: Produce as much as you (the animal) can, or I will kill you. 
This ―contract,‖ according to Regan, is unconscionable and does not even count as a true 
contract as the animal has no say in its participation.  
 For the same reasons that Singer‘s arguments are practically weak, Regan‘s 
position fails to meet our successful ethical system requirements. Additionally, it is 
unclear if animals actually possess the requisite cognitive abilities to be a true subject-of-
a-life as defined by Regan. He includes abilities like having a sense of the future, and how 
well or ill their decisions affect such a future as requirements for being a subject-of-a-
life. Can a cow really anticipate the long-term benefits of, say, a surgery to untangle her 
long intestine, or is it simply consumed in a confused and primal fear? Can a cow 
significantly anticipate the future at all? If not, then perhaps the rights associated with a 
given species may be a matter of degree, even if their inherent value is not. Furthermore, 
the animal agriculture industry will continue to exist as long as people demand animal 
products—and this is not going to change any time soon. This does not condone their 
actions in any sense; however, it does require that any ethical theory which settles for 
nothing less than total abolition will suffer from being impractical. 
In response, the collective industry reaction to such militant calls for abolition of 
animal agriculture has been one of strong defensiveness and has actually harmed any 
attempt to create better welfare conditions for animals by confounding open dialogue on 
the issues. As was the case with every other major civil rights movement, change 
happens slowly over time and always by working to improve the organization or 
institution‘s current practices, not by abolishing the organization itself. When slavery 
was abolished, agriculture and domestic work wasn‘t eliminated, the structure is what 
changed. When women‘s suffrage passed in the US, the American government wasn‘t 
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eliminated, the structure was merely amended. Similarly, if the goal is to improve the 
welfare of animals, abolition of the entire animal agriculture system is perhaps not the 
answer. Structural change is what is necessary. 
 Bernard Rollin‘s influential work on animal rights is an expression of just this. 
His use of ―rights‖ is merely a legal and rhetorical tool, based on our current culture‘s 
moral language; to ensure basic welfare conditions of animals that are otherwise unable 
to do so themselves, rather than the categorical and absolute kind of rights for which 
Regan argues. He admits of only one absolute ―right,‖ but it is not of the same type as 
normally construed, e.g. normative duties for preventing harm. The right he is concerned 
with is a level higher than this: what he terms a ―meta-right.‖ As he puts it,  
―Thus, to put our conclusion in the language of ―rights,‖ we have established that 
animals have a very basic right, a right that is on a higher level than any 
particular right, namely, the right to be dealt with or considered as moral objects 
by any person who has moral principles, regardless of what those moral 
principles may be.‖109  
 
This effectively establishes animals as moral objects but does not promote any normative 
or specific action towards them, only that they be considered as morally relevant. From 
here he builds a network of related ―rights,‖ but in essence they are all further 
elaborations of what it means for an animal to be ―dealt with as a moral object.‖ 
Philosophically, his work is as equally concerned with the suffering of animals as 
Regan‘s; however, the conditions under which this is addressed are altogether different. 
It would also be a mistake to call Rollin‘s position a rights approach, even though he 
relies heavily on this kind of language in his legal and philosophical oeuvre. In truth, his 
approach is closer to that of Singer‘s, but from an Aristotelian Teleology perspective 
rather than a Utilitarian calculus. One could call it a ―welfarist-teleology,‖ 
                                                          
109 Rollin, B. (2006). Animal Rights and Human Morality, Third Ed. p. 110. 
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consequentialist ethical theory. Understanding Rollin‘s definition of teleology is integral 
in understanding his argument, and will be discussed in depth.  
Rollin capitalizes on Aristotle‘s definition of telos (literally ―end‖ or ―goal‖) to 
undergird his argument that animals count as objects of moral concern (much of the 
argument we have already covered). In using a spider as an arbitrary example, Rollin 
defines telos as ―a nature, a function, a set of activities intrinsic to it, evolutionarily 
determined and genetically imprinted that constitute its ―living spiderness.‖110 He 
continues that the life of something with a telos consists in a ―struggle to perform these 
functions, to actualize this nature, to fulfill these ends, to maintain this life…or a drive to 
preserve its integrity and unity.‖111 This is essentially a more robust definition of what 
was earlier discussed about a life mattering to a living being. Rollin is careful to point out 
that these actions or struggles are not necessarily consciously performed, and in fact the 
most basic and important of these self-preservation actions are usually instinctual, even 
for humans. An example of this is our need for oxygen; we may not always be consciously 
aware of this need, but it still very much matters to us if our means of getting it is 
thwarted. Having a telos means by definition that one has interests, and that any actions 
that attempt to actualize this proves that the being cares about what happens to it. 
Because we have based our conception of morality and what it means to be an object of 
moral concern on the capacity to have such interests, it follows for Rollin that animals 
are obvious examples of this.  
In the ensuing sections of his book Animal Rights and Human Morality (2006), 
Rollin outlines how the various practices of scientific research, wildlife management, and 
agricultural use of animals either do not or need to better account for the various teloi of 
                                                          




the animals in question. For the purposes of agriculture, Rollin is explicit in stating, 
much as we have in the first chapter, that industrial protocols have usurped traditional 
husbandry values and reduced welfare measurements to productivity levels. Accordingly, 
this has meant that the telos of the animal is not respected and often dismissed in favor 
of economic goals. If one considers the overall argument for animal morality as was just 
conceived, this is a direct affront on the most basic ―meta-right‖ of the animals. Because 
of the widespread welfare problems associated with this, Rollin criticizes the industry for 
its moral irresponsibility.  
This position is perhaps the most promising philosophical argument for both 
accepting animals as objects of moral concern and developing practical solutions to 
welfare problems, although it still suffers from some weaknesses. The strength of this 
view comes in the ability for scientific research to account for the many of the 
characteristics associated with a given animals telos. Scientists can demonstrate the 
specific behaviors, social needs, and environmental conditions that promote the inherent 
nature of an animal, and then apply such findings to legal and industrial measures to 
ensure steps are taken to account for them. This makes Rollin‘s argument succeed where 
the previously discussed arguments have not—in that it lends itself well to practical 
application and avoids many of the extreme conclusions that make the other views 
unpalatable. Rollin does not endorse the elimination of animal agriculture or animal 
liberation as do Singer and Regan, but rather hopes to find a compromise that allows 
agriculture to keep up production and still maintain an acceptable level of animal 
welfare. Paradoxically, it is just this malleability of Rollin‘s argument that might be its 
weakness. It is unclear whether or not the measures Rollin deems necessary can 
adequately ensure enough of an animal‘s wellbeing in the face of industry pressures. 
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Still, this argument is able to overcome this weakness. In terms of industry 
response, it is unclear how defenders of current agricultural practices can overcome the 
criticisms in Rollin‘s argument. There will have to be a major Gestalt shift that takes the 
animals under the industry‘s care as morally relevant beings that require a level of 
respect for the animals‘ wellbeing, rather than as merely production machines whose 
needs are subservient to the whims of man.  
 





 The last ethical stance I will evaluate on the topic of ensuring animal welfare in 
agriculture requires only a brief discussion. There exist some important philosophical 
theories that hold the main reason to act morally is the subsequent benefit for oneself. 
According to this view, a morally good life is the highest excellence man can achieve. 
These are variously called Virtue theories or Character Ethics and emphasize the 
alignment of mental states, habit formations, and beliefs with ―virtues‖ that partake of 
what is considered the ultimate good of mankind, and thereby make the person himself 
good. The technical details of this view are irrelevant to our discussion; I introduce this 
branch of ethical theory only to use one of its main principles: that our actions constitute 
and reflect our character, that this character can be deficient or exemplary, and that an 
exemplary character constitutes a truly happy or successful life. I would like to apply this 
principle to animal welfare and the role of agriculture in ensuring it; specifically, I argue 
that according to this view, the agriculture industry suffers from a deficient character in 
its current practices. 
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Although not considered a virtue ethicist, Immanuel Kant does frequently cite the 
importance of a good character in connection with moral actions. His moral theory relies 
heavily on the assertion that in order for someone to act morally, she must possess a 
―good will‖ or inner state that is concerned with promoting justice and other morally 
good values. His position on the cognitive abilities and the moral standing of animals is 
rather contrary to current positions on the matter;112 however, he did maintain in several 
of his works that cruelty towards animals is to be avoided because it reflects poorly on a 
person‘s character and is evidence of a weak moral will. As an example, in the much read 
1785 work Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, he comments: 
―Cruelty to animals is contrary to man's duty to himself, because it deadens in 
him the feeling of sympathy for their sufferings, and thus a natural tendency that 
is very useful to morality in relation to other humans is weakened.‖113 
 
Elsewhere, Kant contends that one can judge the heart of a man by his treatment of 
animals, and that cruel treatment of animals often leads to cruel treatment of other 
people.  
Another telling example of character flaws associated with animal cruelty has 
already been mentioned. The American Psychiatric Association‘s DSM-IV entry on 
Antisocial Personality Disorder directly cites animal abuse as an early sign of a 
psychopathic neurosis. While cruelty is significantly different than abuse, with cruelty 
sometimes being an unconscious result of someone‘s actions—as in the case with 
agriculture, the consequences for the victim tend to be the same. Additionally, it is very 
difficult to tell the difference between cruelty and abuse and in much of the activist 
literature condemning the industry, these are often conflated with each other.  
                                                          
112 He was among the group that excluded animals from moral consideration because they lack 
many of the requisite cognitive abilities that warrant consideration. His final conclusion was that, 
―Animals... are there merely as a means to an end. That end is man.‖ Q.v., Kant, I. (1963). Lecture 
on Ethics. L. Infield (trans.). HarperTorchBooks, p. 239. 
113 Kant, I. (1998). Groundwork on the Metaphysics of Morals. Mary Gregor (trans), part II, paras  
16 and 17. 
61 
 
Obviously, the animal agriculture industry should want to avoid being labeled as 
clinically psychopathic. Much of the dialogue between the animal agriculture 
representatives and industry critics has been on the character of the industry, often 
drowning out any other discussion. There is some relevance in this often overly 
emotional and rhetorical debate: If the industry continues to act in ways that, for 
example, weaken the dairy cow‘s resilience in the face of environmental and physical 
strain, then it shows a wanton attitude towards the life of the creature in favor of 
economic gain. This reflects a corrupt character. In light of my other arguments, it would 
seem that the industry would be well served by increasing its efforts to ensure better 
welfare of its animals. 
 




The preceding discussion hopefully gave enough of a philosophical background 
on the necessity of including animals into general moral consideration, and specifically 
into industry initiatives in agriculture. In this second section, I will now argue that a 
failure to do this will result in the eventual social regulation of agriculture in a way that 
will hinder the successful continuation of the industry. I argue this based on a 
sociological interpretation of the role of morality in societies and in the very nature of 
agriculture. Ethical imperatives that are laid down by a society are, in part, expressions 
of its need for self-preservation; in fact it could be described as one of the primary ways 
that a society organizes and protects itself from potentially hazardous influences. This is 
certainly not a foreign concept for social scientists. As moral-economist and sociologist 
Andrew Sayer, Lancaster University, describes morality, ―The moral concerns lay norms 
(informal and formal), conventions, values, dispositions and commitments regarding 
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what is just and what constitutes good behavior in relation to others, and implies certain 
broader conceptions of the good or well-being.‖114 Especially in terms of economic 
language, morality has often been construed by social scientists as a kind of ―normative 
contract‖ based on trust between parties that serves to bind a society in a unified social 
logic. Breaching such contracts threatens the very foundation of how a society interacts 
with itself.115 Our US Constitution and Bill of Rights have this as their most distinct goal, 
and are quite explicit in this regard. Furthermore, the legal debates that have surrounded 
most, if not all, of our country‘s most famous ethical transitions, e.g. the abolition of 
slavery, women‘s suffrage, gay rights, abortion issues, even such failed movements as 
prohibition in the 1920‘s, have all centered around addressing breaches in this contract. 
Failure to account for these ethical problems is seen as a very real threat to the well-
being of a country. This applies equally to the internal organization of an industry, and 
certainly has lead to many federal regulations of industries that have undermined the 
nation‘s social order. 
This, however, does not mean that industries and other groups in a social 
organization are keen in their support of socially defined ethical imperatives. The current 
position in much of the animal agriculture industry is intransigent and loud in its 
rejection of any regulation attempts, denying the veracity of many of the criticisms 
against their standard practices which supposedly necessitate such regulations. This is 
most certainly a product of an economic-based fear rather than an informed position, 
and shows the total inability of the defenders of current practices to mount proper 
ethical arguments. This is, of course, not universally true of every member in agriculture 
                                                          
114 Sayer, A. (2005). Perspectives on Moral Economy. Unpublished manuscript prepared for  
conference on Moral Econmoy at Lancaster University, UK, in August 2005. 
115 This is described in detail in K. Browne & B.L. Milgram, eds. (2009), Economics and Morality: 
Anthropological Approaches, E.P. Thompson (1991). Customs in Common, and Mauss, M. (1990 
[1925]). The Gift. (q.v.)  
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and there are examples that attest to progressive and intelligent discussions between 
critics and farm organizations. However, the overwhelming attitude of the industry has 
been stubbornly reactionary. In the section following this I will examine the ideological 
reasons behind this, but for now it is necessary to provide evidence for my claims.  
The global trend in political involvement in agriculture is one of increasing 
regulation. For animal agriculture, this has been largely expressed in terms of ensuring 
food safety, better waste management, and stronger animal welfare standards. This is 
due in great part to a growing social climate concerned with the living conditions of food 
animals, with organizations like PETA and HSUS at the helm. These activist 
organizations are gaining an increasingly strong political lobbyist presence, made even 
stronger by the increasing number of publicly available media outlets aimed at ―outing‖ 
the ethical shortfalls of the industry. Authors Michael Pollan, Anne Lappé, Bill 
McKibben, and Barbara Kingsolver consistently publish books defaming the industry, 
while impossible-to-watch-movies like Food Inc. fill the common social imagination with 
the abject horrors of animal suffering in intensive factory-farms. The political influence 
of these movements may not be as extensive as their pro-agriculture correlates, but they 
have still been powerful enough to secure the success of federal and state mandates such 
as regulations against tail docking, sow stall and battery cage elimination, and other 
welfare measures. The creation of the Pew Commission on Industrial Farm Animal 
Production (PCIFAP) and successful publication of their 2008 report: ―Putting Meat on 
the Table: Industrial Farm Animal Production in America‖ is another, perhaps the most 
holistic and informed organization, to engage in ethical considerations of animal 
agriculture. Their work was developed by some of the leading experts in both industry 
and academia, and has spurred a stronger discourse on these issues and continues to 
influence both legal reforms and industry decisions.  
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As further proof of the growing social movement, nations in Europe and the 
southern Pacific have already adopted stringent agriculture regulations on the proper 
handling and care of agriculture animals.116 While slower to engage these issues, the US 
has been adopting similar regulations following the EU‘s trajectory. In fact, in 2004 
alone, over 2,000 state laws were proposed relating to animal welfare and cruelty 
prohibitions.117 While it is true that few of these proposed laws actually passed, the sheer 
volume of legal pressure these propositions represent is evidence of the social pressures 
behind them. The rising tide of social interest in improving animal welfare conditions on 
farms, paired with a historical precedent for social movements initiating political and 
legal reforms (discussed in depth later) should provide enough reason to assume that 
legal measures will continue to pass through the legislative branch and significantly 
impact American farming practices. This is effectively an ultimatum for the industry: 
change on your own, or be forced to do so. 
As was suggested earlier in this chapter, agriculture is, by virtue of its 
relationship to society and what it produces, a very different kind of organization than 
other industries. A manufacturer that produces something as banal as widgets, or even 
an industry as complicated as the automobile industry does not, inherently, produce or 
interact with society in a very deep moral sense. If the auto-industry disappeared 
tomorrow, life would be more inconvenient perhaps, but we would still manage to carry 
on as a society well enough. If agriculture were to vanish overnight, the result would be 
disastrous. We rely implicitly on agriculture as an industry to feed us, to provide a 
necessary social good, without which our society as such would cease to function. Not 
only does the industry provide such a good, but as has already been established, relies 
                                                          
116 Q.v., European Commission (EU Legislative Branch) website on animal welfare laws:  
(http://ec.europa.eu/food/animal/welfare/) 
117 Rollin (2006). Science and Ethics, p. 103 
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implicitly on objects of moral concern to produce such goods. Dairy cattle are objects of 
moral concern and therefore should be recipients of the respect this entails. 
These characteristics give the dairy industry membership into a very small group 
of social services that defy and overwhelm economic concerns. Examples include our 
healthcare system and medicine, education, and government. While it is true that 
economic factors and values certainly play a large role in this kind of organization, it 
would be an obvious mistake to say that all of the values, moral responsibilities, and 
social expectations of these groups can be contained neatly in economic terms. Common 
intuition seems to suggest that the accumulation of wealth is of secondary or 
instrumental concern to maintaining one‘s health, wellbeing, and personal fulfillment—
not to mention the responsibility to care for objects of moral concern. We therefore 
expend a great deal of public energy and intellectual rigor in how a society should 
construct and uphold this kind of organization. Part of this translates to how society 
should regulate its actions because these decisions have direct and significant impact for 
all of the parties involved. Agriculture is certainly such an organization, however it is not 
operating as such nor is it being regulated in the manner it should be as defined by other 
organizations that fulfill similar, necessary social goods. This is a problem. 
Despite this, it would be a fair assessment to call the general response by industry 
leaders and their subservient organizations to the current and pending regulations 
obstinate and uncompromising. In reviewing these responses, it seems as if any attempt 
to reform or regulate the way farm animals are used has been seen as a personal affront 
and threat to be countered. A news release by the American Farm Bureau Federation on 
the then new European Union laws for farm animal welfare adopts this tone: 
―American producers already face a slew of expensive government rules, but 
when it comes to animal welfare they are largely bound by state anti-cruelty laws 
and their own ethical standards. The last thing U.S. producers need is to have 
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their competitiveness trimmed further by the introduction of European-style 





2.2A Scientific Research Regulation as Analogy 
 
 
This is not a unique response to new social movements. A similar state of affairs 
accompanied the desegregation of schools, anti-discrimination laws, and other civil 
rights reforms with many affected business and organizations condemning the reforms 
as apocalyptic for their valued way of life. This also happened in animal research, and an 
analogy to our topic should be made with the debate that has gripped the scientific 
community since the 1960‘s. In his Science and Ethics (2006), Bernard Rollin provides a 
clear account of this battle. The scientific community, until recently, was largely opposed 
to having their research subject to ethical regulations which they saw largely as matters 
of emotion and not the ―objective reason‖ that should guide science. The practices in 
question were on the methods of invasive research, animal handling standards, and the 
lack of pain-controls in animal-based research. Researchers questioned the necessity of 
ensuring a certain standard of life, including controlling pain in creatures that very well 
may not feel pain at all, while critics argued the opposite. The debate between activists 
and researchers was heated and allowed for no middle ground, with activists accusing 
researchers of Nazi-like behavior and the other side calling activists ―anti-science crazies 
hell-bent on disrupting Western Civilization.‖119 It became increasingly clear, however, 
that the scientific community could level no legitimate ethical defense for its method of 
research. Studies demonstrating the ability of animals to feel pain, among other 
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American Farm Bureau Federation. Retrieved from http://www.fb.org 
119 Rollin, B. (2006). Science and Ethics, p111. 
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arguments (e.g. the anxiety caused by uncontrolled, extreme pain from invasive research 
can confound any results), culminated in a large-scale reform of research protocols, such 
as the expansion of Institutional Review Board (IRB) mandates in the National Institute 
of Health reviews for research. 
This fear of regulation was as strong as it was because it was predicted to ―greatly 
disrupt research‖ and block finding important results, as legislation is often not 
intelligent enough to allow the necessary freedom for scientists to do their work. 
According to Rollin, this was born from a blinding ideology within the research 
community that said science is ultimately value-free and imposing values would corrupt 
research. Following in the views of logical positivism, many working scientists held that 
proper science should only allow for empirically verifiable statements120. Viewing ―value‖ 
in general and ethical propositions specifically as wholly unverifiable and a product of 
subjective creations, the ideology contends that such elements need to be removed from 
consideration in research. Even on a very elementary level, this is not true. The frame of 
reference by which we approach the world greatly shapes what we perceive and what is 
taken as relevant. For example, when I reach for the coffee cup in front of me, I see only 
the cup and a little around it, ignoring what is to my far left and not seeing at all the 
bridge of my nose or my retina, although both are directly in my field of vision. This most 
certainly holds in science. As a very elementary example, when a chemist and a biologist 
are studying water the chemist will be primarily concerned with the elements composing 
it while the biologist will be concerned with its potential to support life. This shows that 
on a fundamental level scientists focus only on what is valuable for their research 
question and tend to ignore the rest. What we value is therefore central to our perception 
and even how the purely ―objective‖ scientist conducts her research. 
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If we extend this discussion to include moral values, we will see that the same 
conditions apply. Research is never done in a vacuum—there is always a goal directing 
what is being studied. As a prime example, the development of the hydrogen bomb 
carried with it obvious ethical consequences and the very decision to begin research on it 
carried a host of value judgments. After the atom-bomb was dropped on Japan, the 
scientists who had done the main research and construction of the weapon were often 
asked if they had any regrets. The response of Sir Rudolf Ernst Peierls, a primary 
member of the Manhattan Project, is especially telling of the extent of this ideology. In 
his 1985 autobiographic article ―Reflections of a British Participant,‖ he very frankly 
claimed that during his time working on the bomb, he did not question the implications 
of using the bomb because he trusted the ―good will‖ of the agency leaders ordering the 
project whose job it was to make those ethical decisions. In other words, it wasn‘t his job 
to consider the morality of the work; he was a scientist, not a politician. In Peierls‘ own 
words, ―In retrospect I have to admit that these views were a little naïve."121 It was a 
moral decision for the scientists to continue working on the bomb knowing the kind of 
destruction it was capable of, and it was a moral decision for the government to initiate 
the project in the first place. The result of this research was an explosion of regulations 
on research, third-party review boards, and other reformations to protect society from 
immoral research. This example shows that ethical values have a very important place in 
science and research.122  
                                                          
121 "I have been asked many times why I continued working for the project when the bomb was no 
longer needed as a deterrent, and whether I felt happy about developing a weapon that was going 
to be used to cause unprecedented destruction and suffering. . . The leaders, I felt, were also 
intelligent men of good will and would try to make wise and humane decisions. In retrospect I 
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122 It could be argued, based on the nature of research like this, that scientific research as an 
industry provides an equally important and necessary social good, with as significant of impact to 
social health, as agriculture, healthcare, and government as discussed earlier. This fact is 
interesting, but not relevant to our discussion.  
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My point in explaining the blindness inherent in the scientific ideology is to draw 
the analogy that agriculture suffers a similar blindness from its own ideology. The result 
of the scientific community ignoring social pressures to ethically regulate its work, and 
denying its duty to accommodate these at all, was massive government involvement that 
forced regulation. A similar fate is already well underway for agriculture. 
 





 Agriculture as an industry is subject to the same consequences that the scientific 
community experienced because of its unwillingness to account for the social ethics 
behind its work. As Rollin explains, ―The array of social ethical revolutions…has forever 
changed the way governments and public institutions comport themselves. This is 
equally true for private enterprise: to be successful, businesses must be seen as operating 
solidly in harmony with changing and emerging social ethics.‖123 Consumer demands 
have led to regulations in every sector of trade from minority representation in 
businesses and schools, warning signs on cigarette cartons, and the more recent trend of 
Corporate Social Responsibility reports that show off a company‘s commitment to 
sustainable business practices. This should apply even more to an industry supplying as 
necessary a social good as agriculture does. Rollin continues, ―Not only is success tied to 
accord with social ethics but, even more fundamentally, freedom and autonomy are as 
well.‖124 Every industry is given a certain level of freedom by society to pursue its goals, 
based primarily on the fact that the general public does not have the proper education to 
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understand the intricacies of a profession (hence the name ―professional‖), yet still desire 
the products of their labors. This amounts to a trust that the company will act in a 
morally acceptable way in return for the autonomy necessary to innovate and succeed. If 
that trust is violated, it is the responsibility of society‘s collective voice (i.e. government) 
to protect itself. Simply put, ―society basically says to professions it does not understand 
well enough to regulate: You regulate yourselves the way we would regulate you if we 
understood what you do, which we don‘t. But we will know if you don‘t self-regulate 
properly and then we will regulate you, despite our lack of understanding.‖125 Failure to 
account for social concerns results inevitably in increased federal regulation, a 
subsequent loss of autonomy, and greater public distrust. 
There is, in fact, good reason to draw the analogy between the responses of the 
scientific community against regulating animal experimentation and the animal 
agriculture community against regulating industry practices on animal welfare. Official 
statements of the American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF), U.S. Farmers and 
Ranchers Alliance (USFRA), and the American Agriculture Alliance (AAA) 126 universally 
condemn current and potential government regulations that seek to reform animal 
handling and breeding practices. Three examples of these organizations‘ most recent 
activities will serve to prove just this. 
The AFBF has been very clear on its position on federal regulation as Bob 
Stallman, president of AFBF since 2000, expressed in a recently released statement on 
new government regulatory reforms, 
―Today, farmers, ranchers, and countless other business owners face a long list of 
federal requirements that are eroding their bottom line; they come in the form of 
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that lobby or work with the US government on the behalf of the agriculture industries.  
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regulations, ―guidance‖, and any number of other agency pronouncements. All 
too often, these agency actions are far from transparent and lack full 




Suffice to say, there is very little support for any external regulation.  
The USFRA is equally condemnatory of regulations, but shifts the blame to 
ignorant and ―susceptible‖ consumers who are too easily swayed by inflammatory 
activist agendas and then vote for regulations based on misinformation. Joe Cornely, a 
director at the Ohio Farm Bureau under USFRA, stated that more realistic expectations 
among consumers are needed, "So often people advocate for a utopian world and it's not 
doable. Feeding the world requires us to kick up some dirt and create a few odors. That is 
just a reality of producing food and fiber that may not fit in with the utopian vision. The 
vast majority of people are reasonable people; they just need to know that you can't have 
the perfect world."128 Such statements bespeak a distrust in both the general public and a 
disdain for regulations, not to mention an embarrassing admission of the industry‘s 
moral grey area. 
Finally, the Animal Agriculture Alliance, a non-profit organization composed of 
the largest corporate and private ―institutes‖ representing a majority of the industry, is 
perhaps the most vehement in its condemnation of both activist work and federal 
regulation. Their 2010 Stakeholder‘s Summit was titled, "Truth, Lies, and Videotape: Is 
Activism Jeopardizing Our Food Supply?‖ and consisted of several workshops and 
presentations providing a ―united response to detractors bent on eliminating the 
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industry.‖129 David Martosko, one of the presenters, spoke on the human cost of the 
animal rights movement, "Animal activists are in the business of creating conflict. It's 
critical to fight back. Ask yourself: do you believe in farming, or do you not? Are you 
willing to defend it, or not?"130 Following this, former Department of Homeland Security 
Undersecretary Asa Hutchinson delivered a keynote address on the growing threat of 
activist terrorism and the need for greater security measures to protect industry. 
Additionally, other publications from AAA denounce any federal regulations or measures 
that have come from activist pressures as they, ―represent a slippery slope that farmers 
and ranchers must be wary of. Animal rights organizations such as HSUS will only be 
satisfied when animal agriculture is entirely eliminated [sic].‖131  
This kind of stance towards critics of the industry, which each of these 
organizations hold, serves only to further alienate the public from true discourse. One 
recommendation that all of these three organizations gave to their members was to 
increase industry public relations efforts to cast a more positive light on agriculture and 
animal conditions and to be more transparent in their practices. This is incompatible 
with their assault on activism. The activist organizations are, after all, composed of the 
same public sector the agriculture industry hopes to influence. If the industry refuses to 
work with every element that influences the federal decisions that affect them, then 
regulations will only have a more detrimental effect by forcing change on an industry 
unwilling to work with the organizations proposing the eventual regulations. 
The worries outlined by Stallman and the AFBF, while consistent with this 
previous critique, do contain an element of truth. While the regulations AFBF contends 
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with may ensure greater welfare standards for animals, their application, time frame, 
and potentially insensitivity to the farmer‘s economic needs do pose a problem for the 
industry. The failures of the US automobile industry over the past decade provide a clear 
example of how federal regulations can affect economic success. It was arguably due in 
part to increased emission standards and its related cost, among other global trade 
variables and poor corporate planning, which led to the auto industry‘s recent collapse. 
Early adopters of emission regulations were able to weather the latest economic 
downturn while late adopters and notoriously eco-unfriendly companies had to be bailed 
out of bankruptcy. Federal banks effectively took the reins of these companies, leading to 
a substantial loss in autonomy. A similar process is already underway in agriculture and 
will continue if the industry doesn‘t take the initiative to change its practices first and in 
a way that takes the unique needs of agriculture into consideration. As one spokesperson 
for the AFBF characterized it, ―New attempts at passing restrictive animal welfare 
legislation in the United States are as sure as the cows coming home.‖132 
Those automobile companies have largely bounced back from their recent 
struggle, however the ―rules of the game‖ under which they previously operated have 
since changed. If the animal agriculture industry hopes to survive this inevitable 
transition with less pain and long term consequence, they must be willing to change the 
old rules themselves to reflect a more ethical modus operandi.  
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 After considering all of the previous discussions, one could rightly ask how the 
animal agriculture industry could have devolved into its current state. Examining the 
underlying ideology that permeates the industry may provide some insight into this. In 
the analogy drawn between the scientific community and the agriculture industry, I 
concluded that, contrary to the scientific ideology, science is not value-neutral. Moral 
considerations play a fundamental part in every research protocol, and must be 
accounted for because of its role in society and to avoid increased regulation and a 
subsequent loss of autonomy and greater public distrust. I had also mentioned that the 
agriculture industry also suffers from a blinding ideology that rejects important moral 
considerations and precludes the ability for defenders of current practices to mount 
proper ethical arguments. This ideology has its roots in current economic theory and 
consists of the belief that the ―bottom line‖ (i.e. overall profit margin) of any industry is 
the singular absolute value. Other concerns, including moral obligations, are violable and 
should only be considered insofar as they do not threaten the bottom line. As such, they 
are effectively translated or reduced to monetary terms; and here again our axial 
question has resurfaced. This is the keystone of an economic decision calculus and a 
hallmark of the economic ideology. Everything must be considered in the only language a 
business can comprehend: money. Stallman‘s previously quoted statement on the harm 
of government regulations is the perfect example of this ideology at play in agriculture. 
In considering this ideology, some questions immediately arise, namely ―Can you fully 
account for the welfare of a sentient being in terms of capital?‖ and ―Can economic 
calculations adequately inform our obligations to objects of moral concern?‖ I would 
answer, no.  
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The fact that the farming industry has either ignored the underlying reasons for 
the systemic failures documented in this essay, or simply been unable to see them as 
morally significant, is a product of this ideology. If it were not the case, there would be 
far more compliance and support of increased welfare standards based on the traditional 
husbandry values that still permeate the industry. Something has usurped these 
traditional moral obligations, and in so doing has also given the profession a revealing 
name change. ―Farming‖ in the US has ceased to become the correct adjective to describe 
the profession; it is now officially the ―animal agriculture industry.‖  
Farming has always been a form of livelihood, a social system that worked under 
an almost sacred contract: The farmer will feed the rest of society in exchange for enough 
money or goods to allow the farmer to live comfortably and continue to produce food. 
This social structure has shifted since the industrial revolution and ensuing urban 
migration. As was outlined in the introduction, food became an investment commodity 
once farm decisions were controlled by middle-men and vertically integrated 
distributors. As with any investment commodity, the promise of greater wealth spurs 
competition and growth, leading to new and innovative production methods to ensure 
continued economic success. Farming was not immune to this transition and is now a 
business, a corporate network, an industry that survives only by competing in a global 
market. Accordingly, the M.O. of the industry is not to ―feed the world‖ as it so 
righteously proclaims133, but to maintain a viable business among its increasing 
competition. Feeding the world is conditional on any surplus capital the industry is 
willing to invest: a form of charity. By holding to this economic ideology, one is forced to 
conclude that it simply costs too much to incorporate ethical standards that don‘t have 
an immediate monetary pay-off. The industry cannot afford to make these changes 
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without a substantial hit to its bottom line, and balks at any attempt to force its hand in 
doing so. I believe this explains much of the intransigent attitude described in the 
previous section.  
For me to show that the economic ideology in agriculture is unable to account for 
such moral concerns as animal welfare, I will first need to elaborate on the features of the 
decision calculus that defines the ideology. A decision calculus is a codified method of 
determining the best possible action based on reasonable predictions of the related 
consequences. In the economic ideology, the calculus used is called ―cost benefit 
analysis‖ (CBA). A robust definition of the general model is given by O‘Neil, Holland and 
Light (2008): 
 "Individuals have preferences whose satisfaction increases their welfare. The 
strength of preferences for marginal changes to their current range of goods can 
be measured by individuals' willingness to pay for their satisfaction... the total 
benefits of the project can be identified by summing the different amounts that 
affected individuals are willing to pay for the marginal changes the project brings, 
the costs by summing the different amounts affected individuals are willing to 
pay for changes not to proceed. A project is worthwhile if benefits are greater 
than costs. Given a choice of projects, we should choose the project that produces 
the greatest sum of benefits over costs."134 
 
For the economic version of the model that concerns our project, the general CBA 
is translated to define the given cost or benefit variables for each decision in terms of 
capital or perceived monetary loss and profit for those players involved in the 
transaction. Based on what has already been presented in this essay, it is clear that 
historically the agriculture industry has used such a capital-based CBA in deciding many 
of its most influential decisions, including its research goals, how it defines its ―best 
practices‖ for handling and breeding animals, and how it engages the public sector. The 
potential benefits of using bST, for example, were analyzed in the research literature 
                                                          




against possible economic costs to the farmer and, less so, to the physical costs to the 
cattle insofar as it would affect production. When studies like the ones compiled by 
Bauman (1992), previously cited, heralded the growth hormone as providing 
―unprecedented gains‖135, the conclusion was decidedly that bST must be used to ensure 
competitive market performance in the growing global trade. Even when evidence 
emerged as to the health risks associated with its use, industry leaders continued to 
promote the use of bST because of the overwhelming economic benefits, blaming any 
animal welfare problems on ―poor management‖ or as marginal issues needing little 
consideration.136  
None of the literature defending current practices takes seriously the accusations 
that these practices significantly detract from the quality of life of the animal, nor do they 
adequately address other morally relevant, non-economic costs or benefits, whether for 
the animals or humans involved. I believe this is because a capital-based CBA cannot 
adequately translate the important aspects of moral issues into monetary terms, only the 
economic costs of implementation, and therefore cannot understand the obligation to 
conform to the acceptable ethical standards. There are other relevant ―costs‖ and 
―benefits‖ besides economic ones that are generally accepted in our social ethic. Physical 
and emotional pain and their obverse of pleasure and joy, feelings of injustice or disgust, 
or the satisfaction felt when you relieve someone else‘s suffering are some examples of 
costs and benefits that cannot necessarily be discerned in a capital-based CBA. We can 
call the collection of variables like these, in addition to the economic variables, the real 
costs and benefits that need to be accounted for in a morally acceptable decision 
calculus.  
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Additionally, it is unclear that a capital-based CBA can justly distribute the real 
(or even economic) costs among the affected parties in its calculus because it is incapable 
of determining any cost to individuals other than the ones who stand to be affected by 
monetary gains and losses. It certainly cannot account for any cost to an animal because 
the concept of money is totally alien to it. If, for the sake of argument, it were a human 
that produced the milk in the dairy industry, what amount would a person be willing to 
pay to accept the level of genetic, bodily, and psychological stress inflicted on modern 
dairy cattle? Alternatively, what amount of capital gain would be acceptable to warrant 
treating a human in this manner? Obviously, all of the real costs and benefits would not 
be accounted for if we decide to put a price to it. To articulate this differently, we can 
consider these real costs and benefits as a kind of social good that cannot be exchanged 
for money. It is a kind of loyalty or relationship we have towards other moral objects to 
respect these goods. As O‘Neill, Holland, and Light contend, ―One cannot buy [social 
goods]. To believe one could, would be to misunderstand those very relationships. To 
accept a price is an act of betrayal.‖137 
Like the scientific ideology, the economic version is blind to moral values, despite 
the fact that these values play a significant role in influencing what is taken as relevant 
and important. Although money may be the primary value in this ideology, there are 
significant underlying values that exist just below the surface. As in science, the aims of 
the various animal agriculture practices were to accommodate as many of the interests of 
the relevant parties as possible. To continue with the bST example, it was originally 
created by Monsanto to provide farmers with an affordable and readily available 
supplement to increase milk production. If the only interested parties were Monsanto 
and a farmer with declining profit margins, there would seem to be little if any further 
                                                          




issue in this case: the benefit of increasing milk production far outweighs the potential 
extra monetary cost of buying the new technology. In essence, that is what Monsanto 
concluded.  
This, however, was not the case. There were interested parties that only revealed 
themselves a posteriori, or after the new technology was implemented. The dairy 
industry‘s research failed to predict all of the parties that would be affected by bST. If we 
add in for example the relative uncertainty of introducing large amounts of growth 
hormone in an eco-system, the interests of poorer farmers who couldn‘t afford the new 
technology, the global market effect of a sharp increase in milk production and its effect 
on poorer nations that couldn‘t subsidize their exports, plus (let us not forget) the 
morally significant interests of the cows themselves; the complexity grows. Just with 
these four new variables, we get an entire host of new interests and new standards for 
what the real costs and benefits are. 
In addition, not only is the market unable to account for moral values in its 
decision calculus, but even the mechanisms by which it is able to change its practices is 
stunted. It can be argued that individual players in an industry that operate under this 
ideology suffer from a version of the ―collective action problem.‖ As it operates now, the 
changes necessary to ensure greater welfare for dairy cattle would translate as an 
increase in production cost—without any economic gain. Any producer, distributor or 
farmer who takes initiative to make moral changes on a grand scale will automatically be 
out-competed by their conventional peers. Separating oneself from the crowd in this 
sense is to commit economic suicide, much as a rogue prey-animal will be quickly picked 
off by a predator. Through rational examination, and my own experience working on 
farms, even if a farmer or industry player wants to change her practices to align with 
higher moral standards, she cannot justify it economically and still be in business.  
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At present, the only way to promote the moral values that a society demands is to 
measure consumer preference and try to match their practices with what the consumer 
wants to purchase. Again, however, the economic paradigm that permeates the industry 
simply cannot perceive what is beyond this including the fact that behind these 
consumer preferences are actual sentient beings that are affected by the whims of the 
consumer and her preferences. The paradigm can therefore not directly reflect the values 
of society, only indirectly measure them through consumer preferences. 
Ethically sound practices that confront conventional ones are believed to be 
inherently more costly by the industry because purely economic values (e.g. efficiency) 
are not given the greatest priority and therefore cause a business working under such a 
model to operate in the red.138 Additionally, the value-added elements of better moral 
standards or long-term viability through more resilient milk-makers are benefits that 
may not be actualized in a meaningful way soon enough to inspire internally-motivated 
changes. As was briefly discussed in the introduction, however, there is not always a 
negative correlation between morally strong practices and efficient business. In the case 
of limitless milk production increases and breeding practices that only favor production, 
it was demonstrated that this is decidedly not the case. A middle ground must be found 
somewhere on the ―efficiency vs value‖ curve that balances both variables without 
detriment to either side of the curve. Therefore, it seems that the only way to make 
sweeping changes in an industry is to apply external forces to effectively ―change the 
rules of the game,‖ as occurred in the scientific research community or the automobile 
industry. If the agriculture industry is forced to operate more ethically across all levels, 
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then competition will not be a factor and other means of externalizing costs will be 
adopted, though not at the expense of the cattle or public health. 
To conclude this section, I would argue that the value complexity inherent in 
intensive animal agriculture practices creates a framing problem that is almost 
impossible for the traditional cost-benefit analysis calculator to handle. By framing, I 
mean the necessary background events or variables that fix our reference point for what 
is relevant and what is not. If we cannot capture all of the interests that are at stake in 
our societal moral ethic with a capital-based CBA, it would follow that some parties will 
be taken advantage of or would fail to realize the greater goal the new research has in 
mind. This is obviously a problem if it causes unacceptable suffering for any of the 
affected groups, as we have shown some of the practices in modern dairy have. As such, 
we are obligated to abandon or revise our decision calculus. Our most basic social ethical 
intuitions include far more than profit margins in determining what is valuable. By 
continuing to ignore these other socially defined obligations, the dairy industry fails in 
its responsibility to regulate itself in the eyes of society. 
 
Argument Conclusion:  
 As a review, I have built on the previous chapter‘s conclusion that current dairy 
industry practices have eroded the physical resilience of the cow, and altogether 
represents a failure of the industry to account for the long-term health of dairying in 
general. From this, I have also shown that ensuring high standards of animal welfare is 
more than merely an economically sound investment; it is a moral obligation and social 
requirement. By virtue of its very nature as a business and provider of a social good, the 
dairy industry, and agriculture in general, must be held morally accountable in its 
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practices and regulated accordingly. As a consequence, if the industry continues in its 
present trajectory, government regulations will inevitably follow as long as social 
pressures remain heavily on the side of animal welfare. These regulations will most likely 
limit the industry in terms of autonomy and freedom to make its own decisions, 
especially if the industry continues to aggressively oppose attempts to reconcile social 
moral values with its own interests. This is a seriously self-defeating attitude that must 
be addressed. Finally, because the dairy industry is governed significantly by a capital-
based cost-benefit-analysis decision calculus, it is unable to meet these conditions, and 
will therefore be subject to these regulations. 
In the interest of being as explicit and complete in my argument as possible, I 
would like to synthesize the preceding three sections into a formal argument: 
(1) If animal welfare is a morally relevant attribute of animal agriculture, and  
(2) If failing to account for this will lead to significant difficulties due to increased 
federal regulation and waning social trust, and  
(3) If the current decision-making apparatus of agriculture precludes an ability to 
address these moral problems,  
Conclusion: Then, such an industry must be subject to greater ethical standards 
than those other counterparts. This is because the dairy industry is subject to 
premises (1)-(3), and is therefore more similar to social-wellbeing operations 
such as healthcare or education, rather than such purely mechanistic industries 
as automotive or widgets. That it would behoove dairy, and all agriculture for that 
matter, to be early adopters of such standards is of secondary concern to the fact 
that a laissez-faire attitude towards agriculture that allows for a rejection of 










The failure of mere economic goals to direct agriculture in an ethically acceptable 
way, and thus to successfully guide its decisions, has been a subject of interest for some 
time. Leo Tolstoy, in his seminal work Anna Karenina (1877) goes into great detail, 
perhaps to excess, expounding upon just this. Although we should not take Tolstoy to be 
an authority on the matter, the musings of his main character, Levin, are worth noting 
and are surprisingly prophetic: 
 
―He maintained that Russia's [agricultural] poverty came not only from an 
incorrect distribution of landed property and false orientation, but had recently 
been contributed to by an alien civilization abnormally grafted on to Russia, 
particularly by the means of communication and the railways, entailing a 
centralization in cities, the development of luxury and, as a result of that, to the 
detriment of agriculture, the development of factory industry, of credit and its 
companion—the stock exchange. It seemed to him that when the wealth of a state 
develops normally, all these phenomena occur only after considerable labor has 
already been invested in agriculture…  
Considering our incorrect use of the land, the railways, brought about not 
by economic but by political necessity, were premature and, instead of 
contributing to agriculture, which was what they were expected to do, had 
outstripped agriculture and halted it, causing the development of industry and 
credit, and that therefore, just as the one-sided and premature development of 
one organ in an animal would hinder its general development, so credit, the 
means of communication, the increase of factory industry… only harmed the 
general development of wealth by setting aside the main, immediate question of 
the organization of agriculture.‖139  
 
 
It seems quite fitting that Tolstoy chose to use the metaphor of unbalanced organ growth 
to describe the effects new and alien variables have caused in agriculture, especially for 
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our discussion of dairy. While the remainder of Tolstoy‘s social commentary on the 
excesses of European social mores does not pertain to our topic, his view of agriculture is 
amusingly on point. This passage is an especially strong articulation of the point I have 
been making—and, allowing for a few liberties in translating it to fit our specific issues, 
serves as a nice literary summary of how economic means cannot fully account for the 
values and needs of agriculture, and the resulting significant consequences.  
As we have seen from the previous discussions, moral concerns, including those 
for the welfare of the food-animal, comprise a significant responsibility for dairy—and 
the greater food-animal industry. In fact, I am convinced that ignoring moral 
responsibilities will inevitably lead to complete failure for any industry, especially those 
that are trusted to provide the kind of necessary social goods that agriculture does. The 
negative ethical concerns that carry the most weight tend to be those that arise from 
short-sighted or corrupt practices, and the offensive nature of these practices is often 
related to their inability to conform to the needs of the society that admonishes them. 
For the dairy industry, not only do the relevant concerns directly affect the long-term 
economic viability of the industry, but there is a very real moral obligation to account for 
the wellbeing of the animals for their own sake. To ignore these concerns, or to operate 
under a system that cannot address them because of overdeveloped economic interests, 
will inevitably retard the development of the industry as a whole. As such, these concerns 
must be addressed, and done so in a way that balances the needs of the farming 
community with the moral obligation they have towards their animals. 
 The goal of this project is not merely to break down the dairy industry and leave 
its scattered remains for the birds, but to direct future work in developing an ethical 
means of addressing the problems inherent in the industry at present. It is a project that 
will hopefully make visible the larger philosophical problem from which the industry 
suffers: economic priorities taking precedence over moral values. The objective of this 
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concluding chapter is my attempt at providing some semblance of the scaffolding 
necessary to move beyond this ideology. With this in mind, I will be reviewing some of 
the current legislation and work already done in this field, as well as discussing other 
potential solutions, provide critiques of them, and in the end suggest a kind of 
amalgamation of the best aspects of each to inspire future work on the subject. We must 
attempt to take a sober look at the ethical problems within the dairy industry and 
recognize the competing needs for all of the parties involved without verging on 
emotional squabbles of the sort which can permeate the discussion. This includes 
weighing in on the economic needs of the industry, social concerns, and other politically 
sensitive factors. 
 The sections of this chapter are organized by solution type and include current 
measures already in place, proposed legal mandates or regulations, and cultural 
paradigm shifts. A final discussion will follow. 
 
 





There are already many laws, voluntary checklists, best-practice 
recommendations and third-party certification standards that are in place to ensure 
greater ethical standards in the dairy industry. These programs have certainly improved 
matters and have garnered some much needed social support for a floundering industry, 
especially with the promise of stronger laws being passed. However many shortcomings 
still exist, mostly due to their lack of scope or the motivations behind their creation. A 
brief review of these is necessary before any critiques can be given. 
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On a federal level, there is only one law which regulates the treatment of dairy 
animals. It is known as the ―Twenty-eight Hour Law‖ and requires that when 
transporting an animal, one ―may not confine animals in a vehicle or vessel for more 
than 28 consecutive hours without unloading the animals for feeding, water, and rest.‖140 
The Animal Welfare Act, the other widely-cited anti-cruelty law that regulates the 
treatment of animals, only regulates a select few animals. Officially, it only ―authorizes 
the Secretary of Agriculture to regulate transport, sale, and handling of dogs, cats, 
nonhuman primates, guinea pigs, hamsters, and rabbits intended to be used in research 
or "for other purposes." It requires licensing and inspection of dog and cat dealers and 
humane handling at auction sales.‖141 A 1970 amendment to the act extended the law to 
include ―all warm-blooded animals determined by the Secretary of Agriculture as being 
used or intended for use in experimentation or exhibition except horses not used in 
research and farm animals used in food and fiber research.‖142 Of the seven acts passed 
since the original Animal Welfare Act which amend or modify its purview, there is no 
mention of farm animals. Why farm animals are not included is never explained by the 
act‘s literature, although at the time when the act was approved and the first 
amendments made, these animal welfare issues were not of major concern and much of 
the practices critiqued in this work and others had not yet surfaced. Federal laws, while 
they do suggest a successful framework for greater ethical legislation, do not provide any 
kind of precedence for more ethical treatment of farm animals or a stronger moral 
constitution for the industry itself.  
The framework provided by the Animal Welfare Act, were it to include farm 
animals, would significantly impact the current industry and require that all current 
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practices, and future practices, be submitted to federal review to determine their impact 
on the welfare of the animals. The structure of the act requires a rigorous upkeep of 
records and detailed treatment of the animals in use that may lead to better ethical 
practices in the long-run.143 In 2004, the European Union passed a version of the Animal 
Welfare Act, although it is far more stringent in its purview in that it also includes farm 
animals. Presently, the European Union Policy on Animal Welfare (EUPAW) is under 
third-party evaluation to assess where the policy can be expanded or amended, with 
hopes to improve ―harmonization‖ between government enforcement, industry economic 
health, citizen cooperation, and greater animal welfare.144 A similar set of standards and 
cooperative investment by all of the stakeholders would certainly benefit America in the 
same way that it has for the EU.  
Local and state laws represent the other form of government regulation in the 
United States. There are stronger and more comprehensive laws on this level, but that is 
not really saying much, due to the dearth of federal legislation. In any case, state laws are 
only slightly more comprehensive in what is covered as unacceptable treatment of farm 
animals, although only fourteen US states have enacted any laws related to farm animal 
welfare. 145 Of these, none of the laws include dairy cattle per-se under their auspices and 
have mostly to do with regulating the confinement of veal calves, pregnant sows, and 
egg-laying hens. Of the fourteen state laws, only seven of them have actually mandated 
regulations on ethical handling or housing standards, while four other states merely 
created some kind of ―Animal Welfare Review Board‖ but did not pass any laws. 
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144 European Commission. (2010). Evaluation of the EU Policy on Animal Welfare & Possible  
Options for the Future. GHK Consulting (Lead Partner). London, UK. 
145 For the complete list, q.v. Rumley, E.R . (2010). States' Farm Animal Welfare Statutes. 




California has passed the most legislation regarding farm animal welfare including 
creating humane standards for housing veal-calves, egg laying hens, and pregnant sows, 
as well as outlawing foie gras production and tail-docking in cattle and ensuring 
―downed animal protection‖ which outlines the treatment of lame farm animals. Most of 
these statutes are covered in their infamous Proposition 2 law, passed in 2008.146 The 
final three states, seemingly acting on a very different opinion of the need for ethical 
agriculture standards, passed laws restricting the enactment of any animal welfare laws. 
Georgia was the most explicit about how it would limit the passage of any regulations, 
mandating that,  
―No county, municipality, consolidated government, or other political subdivision 
of this state shall adopt or enforce any ordinance, rule, regulation, or resolution 
regulating crop management or animal husbandry practices involved in the 
production of agricultural or farm products on any private property.‖147  
 
As per my discussion in the previous chapter on the necessity for federal 
legislation in leveling the playing field and eliminating the ―collective action‖ dilemma in 
the industry, it would seem an effective piece of an overall solution to increase the 
federal and/or state activity on animal welfare laws for farm animals. Laying this 
framework for acceptable treatment of farm animals would provide a starting point for 
ensuring that moral values play a greater role in determining how the dairy industry 
operates. As it stands now, however, the laws are not strong enough nor are they 
extensive enough to account for the specific needs of the dairy industry.148 Because of 
                                                          
146 Proposition 2: Standards for Confining Farm Animals. CA (2008). 
147 Prohibition on Regulation of Farm Production by Local Governments. Ga. Code Ann. § 2-1-6  
(a).  
148 Although the scope of this paper cannot include a discussion of all of the factors influencing 
political and economic policy in agriculture, it cannot be ignored that there are elements in 
agriculture that are steeped in political turmoil and deeply involve the dairy industry. Corn is a 
paradigm case of this. Corn prices, controlled in a significant way by federal subsidies, also 
directly affect feed costs as corn is a staple in dairy feed. Therefore, much of animal agriculture is 
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this, the economic leash that has until now dissuaded and limited farmers and industry 
from adopting stronger ethical policies is still as strong as ever. An intelligent and 
thorough analysis of the ways industry concerns, social interest, and animal care can be 
balanced is necessary before any new laws can be created.  
  
3.2 Proposed Legal Mandates for Ensuring Greater Ethical Standards in Dairy 
 
 
Every year, and with every change in government administration, more bills are 
proposed concerning ethical agriculture regulation. Organizations like the Pew 
Commission on Industrial Farm Animal Production (PCIFAP), animal activist 
propositions, and industry lobbyists are constantly working to promote their own views. 
While few of these proposed laws have any chance of passing, they each represent a 
viewpoint and concern that should be considered in developing a more holistic legal 
response to the moral issues at hand. The Pew Commission represents one such attempt, 
and should be considered more seriously. 
The Pew Commission report has already been briefly mentioned, and I need not 
go into too much detail on the specifics of the report; however, the recommendations of 
the commission may provide some kind of template for future work on incorporating 
moral considerations into agriculture. The report focuses primarily on four areas of 
moral concern: public health, the environment, animal welfare, and rural communities. 
For the purposes of this project, I will only use their work on animal welfare and rural 
                                                                                                                                                                             
controlled, or at least directed, by American Corn production. These kinds of interactions only 
serve to complicate the interactions between politics, industry, and society.  
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communities.149 The suggestions the PCIFAP offer in these areas are to: (1) Phase out 
and then Ban the nontherapeutic use of antimicrobials (including antibiotics and 
antimicrobials designed as growth promoters); (2) Phase out intensive confinement 
(including veal/sow/hen crates, as well as providing adequate natural movement for 
dairy cattle which may include reintroducing pasture feeding); (3) Increase competition 
in the Livestock Market to hopefully improve the economic situation in animal 
agriculture and help to buffer any costs improved welfare standards may bring; and 
finally, (4) Improve research in animal agriculture to increase transparency in what is 
being researched by the industry and to include research into other-than-economic 
improvements in animal husbandry.150  
These suggestions have been received with mixed support. A contra-report by the 
Animal Agriculture Alliance (AAA), an industry backed organization, called many of the 
findings of the Pew Commission into question, claiming that the commission did not 
take an objective enough stance in its scientific research and ignored the AAA‘s own 
research which found different results. They further claimed that PCIFAP ―favors 
opinions over science‖ and supports activists groups that want to ―eliminate factory 
farming‖ altogether.151 Whether or not these claims are accurate, and it is my opinion 
that their own biases and interests have detracted from their credibility, more rigorous 
work and peer-review research is needed before the Pew suggestions can be conscionably 
put to work. However, regardless of the comments of nay-sayers like AAA, the work of 
the Pew Commission is an important step forward in creating a comprehensive solution 
to the ethical problems in the dairy industry. 
                                                          
149 For the full report, q.v. Pew Commission on Industrial Farm Animal Production. (2008). 
Putting Meat on The Table: Industrial Farm Animal Production in America.  
150 PCIFAP Report, Executive Summary (2008). pg 21-23.  




Another promising solution has come from David Favre, Professor of Law at 
Michigan State University and fellow lawyer Jaime Olin. They have drafted a template 
for future comprehensive animal welfare laws based primarily on EU legislation and the 
US Animal Welfare Act. Their ―Model National Animal Welfare Legislation‖ was 
designed to ―represent general animal welfare legislation that can be easily adopted by 
developing countries,‖ and also sets out ―specific criminal actions, and a process for 
future regulatory acts by national and local governments.‖152 The model law outlines 
three commitments: ―(1) Animals, having both intrinsic and extrinsic value to human 
societies, deserve special protection of their individual interests under the law. This 
statute acknowledges the obligations that humans have toward animals. (2) All branches 
of the government shall endeavor to implement the spirit of this law in assuring the best 
possible life for animals within our community. (3) This law acknowledges the rights of 
humans to keep and use animals, but only where the interests of the animals are 
recognized and protected.‖153  
The ensuing statutes elaborate on these goals and define strict regulations for the 
treatment of farm animals. Some of the more philosophical regulations include 
respecting each individual animal and altering methods of husbandry, transport, and 
slaughter as new, more humane methods are developed. Additionally, the model law 
requires that animals are kept in enclosures where the animal has ―ample room to rise to 
its full height, turn around, lie down, and will not incur any danger from the enclosure 
itself‖, a greater ―acknowledgment of the social behaviors of the species when 
determining the number of animals to keep per enclosure,‖ and these findings be used to 
ensure the appropriate amount of space, fresh air, social interactions, access to exercise, 
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and appropriate social grouping practices is given.154 Interestingly, the model law would 
also regulate against giving animals growth hormones, a stricture that will undoubtedly 
be contested but which follows from the discussion presented in my project. Work such 
as Favre‘s and Olin‘s would certainly encourage more dialogue on the ethical 
implications of animal agriculture and spur greater federal and state action to settle and 
disputes. 
Activist organizations like HSUS and PETA have also offered their own 
suggestions on new regulations, and some (especially in California) have been 
successfully passed. The recent Proposition 2 law in California, previously discussed, was 
heavily funded by HSUS and supported by PETA representatives. Typically construed as 
radical groups and demonized by industry organizations like AAA as unabashedly as the 
activists groups demonize the industry, these organizations and their legislative victories 
have become stumbling blocks in open dialogue between the two groups. Industry 
groups have increased their smear-campaigns to match their peers at HSUS and PETA in 
attempts to gain greater support from voters. Regardless of the ability of these new laws 
to ensure higher ethical standards in agriculture, the ensuing partisanship and 
aggressive opposition they garner may have a negative long-term effect and create 
political instability as administrations shift over the years. It is a legitimate worry that 
any groundbreaking laws passed that are opposed by large industry groups may be 
susceptible to being overturned with changes in federal or state administration. This 
vulnerability will exist as long as a greater cultural paradigm shift does not accompany 
these new laws. Therefore, it would follow that more cooperative endeavors like those of 
the Pew Commission are needed to protect any new legislations from this kind of 
uncertainty. 




As a final note in this section, there has been a growing trend within the dairy 
industry for farmers to develop or apply voluntary ethical standards and certifications to 
their operations. The National Dairy Farm Association‘s ―Caring for Dairy Animals 
Technical Reference Guide and On-The-Dairy Self-Evaluation Guide,‖ the National Dairy 
Animal Wellbeing Initiative ―Principles and Guidelines for Ethical Care of Dairy Cattle,‖ 
and the Federation of Animal Science Societies‘ ―Guide for the Care and Use of 
Agricultural Animals in Teaching and Research‖ checklists are three examples of 
industry-initiated moves to account for moral responsibilities in the dairy industry. 
These guidelines are generally concerned with how to best manage a farmer‘s dairy herd 
in order to account for minimal welfare standards while still maintaining a profitable 
bottom line. Examples of ―good practices‖ from these guidelines include, turning out 
animals daily for exercise (weather permitting), giving animals room to stand and lie 
down, room to stretch, eat, drink, and eliminate comfortably; ensuring that the animals 
receive adequate nutrition and water to achieve a proper body condition score and be fed 
in a way that promotes health and reduces the risk of disease; and finally to support the 
use of science-based practices that promote animal-wellbeing in laboratory animals in 
research settings.155 
These kinds of solutions are important to consider because they address what I 
have been arguing from the beginning—that a new ethical code for agriculture must 
balance the needs of the industry with a concern for the wellbeing of the animals. These 
                                                          
155 I‘ve used the following checklists for examples of ―best practices‖ that take animal welfare into 
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National Milk Producers Federation. (2010). The Animal Care Management Checklist. Retrieved  
from: www.nationaldairyfarm.com.;  
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checklists are attempting to do this and are generally successful in maintaining economic 
viability in the process. There may be legitimate concern with these voluntary standards, 
however, as enforcing them could be difficult. It is also questionable how adequate they 
can be in ensuring high enough ethical standards. Most of these certification programs 
are developed internally to the industry, and seem to operate primarily from the same 
economic paradigm that was critiqued in the previous chapter. This presents a worry 
that the industry will still be unable to perceive all of the moral values that should be 
accounted for in a properly ethical operation.  
 
3.3 Cultural Paradigm Shift as a Solution 
 
 
Finally, I want to examine a more philosophical discussion on the cultural 
paradigm that currently predominates in US society. The greatest impetus behind the 
new infatuation with animal welfare and ethical agriculture within pop-culture comes 
directly from a changing cultural paradigm. With each new generation, moral values 
seem to grow and encompass more areas. One hundred years ago, there were only a 
select few moral problems on the social radar, while now there seems to be a moral 
undertone to almost every major activity in private, public, and industrial sectors of 
society. Many philosophers and social scientists have argued that, despite a growing 
concern for animal welfare and more ethical agriculture, the underlying social attitude 
toward agriculture has remained unchanged and thus limits any real change to how the 
agriculture industry operates. Popular understanding of where our food comes from and 
how it is produced is still quite limited despite the unprecedented growth and research 
success the industry has had. Lack of concern and the growing popularity of 
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convenience, affordability, and immediate gratification seem to predominate the general 
attitude of Americans toward their food. The growth of supermarket chains like Wal-
Mart, Costco, and others whose food prices seem to always be dropping speak directly to 
this. In general, it is arguable that convenient, cheap food is preferable to ethically 
produced, but expensive alternatives. At present, ―moral‖ food is considered a luxury 
compared to the conventional alternatives. 
Many philosophers and social scientists have been arguing recently for a more 
fundamental change in society and industry values than legal regulations can affect. Our 
cultural reliance and modern perspective on agriculture and the animals within it is 
undergoing a significant shift—and not always in an ethically progressive manner. 
Examining the current social paradigm, some important intellectuals are proposing a 
radical Gestalt shift in the way we approach both our food system and the animals that 
provide us with food. The ―New Social Ethic‖ described by Bernard Rollin is a model case 
of this kind of intellectual work.  
Rollin was able to pin-point early on the origin of the rise in public concern for 
the welfare of animals and moral standards in animal agriculture. He claims that its 
source was a growing awareness that animals were sentient creatures and their 
unnecessary suffering an atrocity. Anti-cruelty sentiment for animals has been pervasive 
in our society for generations and was the primary means of assessing the moral 
acceptability of animal use. Our earlier discussion, linking animal cruelty to psychotic 
personalities, and society‘s condemnation of such behavior, demonstrates this. A 
growing pool of data shows, however, that the suffering of animals in agriculture is not 
due to cruelty at all—it is a symptom of the lack of values and growing industrialization 
within the agriculture industry. Accordingly, a ―new social ethic‖ is needed, and is slowly 
developing, to accommodate this new moral shortfall in agriculture that does not take 
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intentional cruelty as its primary measure of acceptability. This new social ethic also 
reflects a growing respect for the symbiotic relationship humans have with their 
domestic animals, and encompasses an awareness of our special moral obligation to 
ensure a higher standard of living for agriculture animals. This new ethic basically 
recognizes the once invisible suffering of animals and our responsibility to address it. 
However, this is not a perfect ethic, and as Rollin explains,  
―It is certainly the case that the new ethic has moved beyond the self-interest 
basis inherent even in husbandry, by self-consciously demanding the mitigating 
of animal suffering in the pursuit of benefits for humans. But, while we try to 
minimize the suffering of animals we use for our benefit, we have little doubt 
about the appropriateness of killing them for food, using them clinically in 
research, or in general unhesitatingly manipulating their lives for our benefit, 
even if it is plain they would rather not be so used.‖ 156 
 
 Rollin believes that society is on its way to accepting animals as intrinsically 
valuable, but is still fully entrenched in the old cultural paradigm that says animals are 
essentially tools for human use. To elaborate, Rollin continues to explain that,  
―Society does not abolish animal research or food animal production; it restricts 
these practices to minimize suffering. But it does not question their acceptability. 
The raison d’être for these animals is still serving humans - witness the locutions 
"food animal", "lab animal". Such animals, like slaves, remain property, albeit, 
again like slaves, property protected against some abuses by law...‖157 
 
The comparison to slavery is poignant and expressive of the general way in which we 
perceive our moral responsibility to animals: We may not want them to suffer 
unnecessarily, but they are still, at base, a means to our ends. 
A stronger, new-―new social ethic‖ will have to engage this old paradigm and 
assess its acceptability in guiding our consumer, political, and industrial choices. It is 
                                                          




perhaps time to reconsider the slave-type attitude we have toward animals, and adopt a 
more symbiotic relationship with them. Rollin believes we as a society have made this 
leap in terms of our companion animals—obvious not only in our language (considering 
them members of our family) but also in how we protect them legally. In considering the 
reasons for excluding food-animals from the same care afforded to pets, it is difficult to 
find any legitimate reason for this, other than the special relationship usually associated 
with companion animals and their owners. The level of sentience and capacity to suffer 
or to express their own telos, admits of very little difference to their house-bound 
relations. The human relationship with food-animals may be different and less 
emotional, but this relationship is still significant. Our use of their bodies for sustenance 
seems to be a relationship that would demand some level of respect. I would argue that 
because of this, our relationship to food animals requires more extensive ethical 
responsibilities than to our pets, despite our relational and emotional distance from 
them. The fact that we need these animals in an important way to feed ourselves as 
opposed to the emotional comfort we get from companion animals should be considered 
as we examine our current social paradigm.  
While this perspective and these goals may not be as pragmatic as the suggestions 
of the Pew Commission or the others previously discussed, they do provide an interesting 
measuring-stick for determining how successful new legislation and practices are at 
ensuring greater ethical standards in an industry. For a new ethic to be truly successful, 
it must closely match with the general moral beliefs of a society. Otherwise, such laws 
and regulations become more of a detriment to social welfare rather than a confirmation 
that such laws are governing effectively. As was discussed in the previous chapter, a 
society‘s moral codes can be seen as a reflection of its attempts to regulate and protect 
itself from chaotic influences. ―Good laws‖ are supposed to be ones that contribute to this 
goal and encourage a stronger and healthier society. Animal welfare laws that ensure 
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higher moral standards and protect the farms and industries that provide citizens with a 
necessary social good should be reflective of the same standards. Additionally, if the 
current trend of recognizing morally unacceptable actions and practices toward dairy 
cattle continues and does not fit squarely with our current social paradigm on our moral 
relationship with animals, it may be time to reevaluate how we perceive and understand 
present relationships and responsibilities to food animals.  
 
 
3.4 Amalgamation of the Best Practices 
 
 
There are positive aspects to each method which may absolve the industry of its 
moral inconsistencies, and should be considered. The practicality of legal solutions, the 
industry voice and more progressive thinking present in voluntary, industry-developed 
guidelines, the strength and moral high-ground of activist approaches, and finally the 
comprehensive nature of a cultural Gestalt shift are elements that should be preserved in 
any solution proffered to the ethical dilemmas outlined in this thesis.  
The legal approach may lack some long-term rigidity as changes in 
administration always increase a controversial law‘s vulnerability; however, the practical 
implications cannot be ignored. Laws have a definite time frame for when and how they 
are enacted and enforced, and require a level of review that should be able to 
accommodate the worries of both industry and society. Arguments over how extensive 
laws should be and who will have to pay the costs associated with compliance can 
eventually be settled, although this may be the biggest hurdle for legal solutions to 
overcome due to the strength of the lobbyists on both sides.  
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Industry developed voluntary checklists and guidelines for ensuring animal 
wellbeing are not typically far removed enough from the economic paradigm to be 
sufficiently comprehensive and account for all of the moral responsibilities inherent in 
dairy. Despite this, the increasing popularity of such checklists demonstrates a much-
needed growth of industry initiative in addressing important moral problems. This 
attitude should be encouraged because it may serve to better empower a defensive 
industry to make real, lasting changes in the way it practice its business.  
On the other side of the fence, activist groups and their legal agenda may indeed 
be able to account for the moral responsibilities we have toward animals in agriculture; 
however, the aggressive tactics and smear-campaigns, just as in any political debate, only 
serve to drive a wedge between concerned social groups and industry leaders. In 
addition, animal activist groups often do not have the sensitivity to acknowledge the 
importance of balancing industry needs within their overall moral scope. As has been 
argued throughout this paper, economic goals are not necessarily wrong or opposed to 
other moral values. It is only when those other values are reduced to economic ones or 
ignored altogether when a problem arises. If the goal is to reform the industry and not 
eliminate it, then accounting for the needs of a business is crucial. 
Finally, a full-fledged cultural paradigm shift poses an interesting puzzle for 
philosophers. On the one hand, this solution is completely holistic and represents one 
that would require by definition, that all of the moral concerns addressed in this paper be 
accounted for. If our society is able to see animals as among the kinds of living things 
that deserve greater moral consideration, and develop a symbiotic relationship instead of 
the more parasitic one enjoyed now, it would mean that many of the current dairy 
practices, research protocols and industry goals would be seen as unacceptable and be 
phased out on their own. Unfortunately, this is a rather rosy dream that lacks immediate, 
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practical strength. It is unrealistic to believe that a new paradigm can be enforced or 
simply materialize because a philosopher proposes it. Gestalt shifts occur over a period 
of time and often after much back-and-forth between competing parties, perhaps never 
fully reaching the ideals originally proposed.158 Instead of arguing that a Gestalt shift is 
the best solution, it may be more appropriate to use this philosophical benchmark as a 
measure of success for other solutions. If a new law, certification standard, or 
commission is developed to address agriculture‘s ethical responsibilities, the effect 
should be one that moves society and industry towards a more progressive cultural 
paradigm and away from the status quo that has perpetuated the moral shortfalls seen 
today.  
From this discussion, three basic values or needs have surfaced as the most 
important to account for in developing an appropriate and strong ethical solution to 
agriculture: ethical strength, economic viability, and verifiability. Charlie Arnot, CEO of 
the Center for Food Integrity and President of CMA, has suggested a similar standard for 
measuring how effective an ethical solution will be in agriculture. Arnot has developed a 
―triangle template‖ to represent the need for stakeholders in the three values mentioned 
to engage in a kind of ―checks and balances‖ conversation to ensure that all of the values 
are adequately being represented. As he explains,  
―If food system practices are not ethically grounded, they will not achieve 
broad-based societal acceptance and support. If they are not scientifically 
verified, there is no way to evaluate and validate the claims of 
sustainability, and if they are not economically viable, they cannot be 
commercially sustained.‖159  
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Scientific verification is one way, but need not be the only method, to ensure that any 
new, ethical practice will work and accommodate all of requirements found to be 
ethically necessary. Regardless, equal participation is required for all three of these 
stakeholders for a solution to really work. I believe that this rather simple standard may 
be an optimal starting point in developing new and better ways of holding agriculture 





A perfect amalgamation of the best aspects of each of these potential solutions 
that we have just covered may be impossible; however, including elements of them in 
future work on this subject will need to be seriously considered, or reasons given for 
their exclusion. Any strong ethical system that hopes to tackle the moral shortfalls of the 
dairy industry—and animal agriculture in general—will need to consider several factors, 
including our responsibility to balance industry‘s economic needs, the social ethic of the 
public, and the welfare of the animals. A new ethic will also need to be pragmatic and 
provide reasonably feasible directives—any ethic that does not lend itself in this way 
should be abandoned or reconsidered. Impractical ―solutions‖ are completely useless as 
there is no way to put them into practice. Therefore, examining legal options, farmer-
initiated standards, and social attitudes may provide a stronger starting point to 
changing our morally-deficient social paradigm.  
I have argued throughout this work that promoting stronger ethical standards in 
agriculture is an economic necessity and a moral responsibility. More work is needed to 
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determine what and how extensive these responsibilities are, but minimal standards are 
needed now that can account for the telos of an animal and avoid as much unnecessary 
suffering as possible. Reexamining agricultural research protocols, new technology use, 
and handling practices is necessary and previously-ignored ethical standards must be 
adhered to. Balancing the needs of the three main stakeholders—morally concerned 
parties, industry, and society—is needed to ensure this and to avoid the pitfalls of an 












 The reduction of moral values and non-economic social concerns to merely 
economic goals has come to dominate and inform the dairy industry‘s self-governance in 
the United States. This is not a new trend, nor did it arise quickly; rather this paradigm 
developed over generations and because of a plethora of social, political, and economic 
transitions beginning at the turn of the previous century. The once symbiotic 
relationship between farmer, cow, and the surrounding population now resembles a 
mostly economic relationship between farmer-distributor and distributor-consumer. 
Because of this, the health and wellbeing of the cow ceased to be the farmer‘s highest 
priority. The industrial revolution, fueled by the great farm to city migration in the late 
1800‘s and early 1900‘s, saw agriculture increasingly controlled by inter-state and even 
international markets rather than direct farm-to-consumer exchanges. Improvements in 
production and transportation technology, breeding science techniques, and ruminant 
nutrition, paired with a growing demand for dairy products, encouraged the dairy 
industry to seek higher profit margins to maintain an increasingly expensive agriculture 
practice and meet the growing federal pressure to develop stronger national and 
international markets.  
 The effect of this accumulation of mostly economically driven external variables 
on the dairy industry was to initiate a paradigm shift in traditional husbandry practices 
to a largely industry-model of organization and production. Fewer cows producing more 
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milk faster and with less monetary cost to the farmer became the MO of industry. This 
resulted in a transformation the cow into a veritable udder on legs, rather than a sentient 
being whose milk helped to support a community. From the 1930‘s to present, selectively 
breeding cattle primarily for their ability to produce milk, in addition to new growth 
hormone technologies, housing systems, and milking practices have changed the cow‘s 
genotype and phenotype to give it the ability to produce an average of 12,000lbs more 
milk per anum than its 1920‘s counterpart. The economic effect of this was to propel US 
Dairy into becoming a leader in international dairy sales; however the non-economic 
effects of this change have been less positive. The cow‘s physical resilience has 
plummeted and the long-term viability of the industry has followed this trajectory.  
 This historical account of the dairy industry and discussion of its current state of 
disrepute has provided a paradigm example of what is facing all of animal agriculture—
indeed all of agriculture. This discussion has unearthed a very deep-rooted ethical 
dilemma in modern agriculture practice and the way in which our society has chosen to 
organize itself. Broadly construed, this can be described as a growing pattern to reduce 
all moral values and ethical obligations to economic variables and to account for them 
only in those terms. The result of this fallacy of reduction, however, is for the industry to 
operate under a social paradigm that can no longer account for some of the most 
important social values that a community depends upon to effectively organize and 
protect itself from chaotic influences. Moral obligations to respect ―objects of moral 
concern‖ and to ensure their continued flourishing, developing a virtuous character, and 
honoring the kind of deep social trust that accompanies industries providing necessary 
social goods (of which agriculture is a part), are examples of values that cannot be neatly 
translated into economic terms. To do so, to reiterate O‘Neil, Holland, and Light, ―would 
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be to misunderstand those very relationships. To accept a price [for our moral 
obligations] is an act of betrayal.‖160 
 In addition to these more general shortcomings of a modern style of agriculture, 
there is a specific moral duty to respect the telos of the animals we use for food—simply 
because of the nature of such creatures. It follows logically from our social ethic for inter-
human relationships that similar restrictions on immoral acts should apply to animals. 
Out of respect for the telos of these animals, and because of the special role of agriculture 
in society, I argue that the dairy industry must follow stricter moral standards, and that a 
continued failure of industry to properly account for these moral obligations will result 
in potentially crippling federal regulation. Furthermore, if the economic paradigm that 
controls the decisions of agriculture really does preclude its ability to account for 
important moral values, then not only must the dairy industry change its practices to 
meet higher social standards, but they must also be willing to fundamentally change the 
very Gestalt which undergirds the industry. Such a change will take remarkable skill to 
do successfully, but it follows from my argument that this must be done in order for 
animal agriculture to become morally acceptable. 
 The final piece of this work detailed some potential solutions that could 
accomplish this, but as was shown from my discussion, none of the current mechanisms 
for change have been successful. There have been a select few promising attempts, and 
by using the best aspects of each a new, stronger, and pragmatic solution could be 
developed. It remains to be seen, however, whether or not the competing parties in this 
discussion can move beyond the hurdles that presently face conversations to improve the 
ethical standing of agriculture. Animal activist groups and industry leaders will need to 
                                                          




find a common ground in order for any potential legal mandate or commission suggested 
practice to have lasting and successful effects.  
 It is my opinion that agriculture, and dairy in particular, can continue to play an 
important role in society and even increase our ability to create a better world. While this 
may be a topic for future work, and certainly moves beyond the largely applied field that 
this philosophy thesis has engaged, it may be time for our Western culture to remember 
the once proud social status we afforded to those who provided our food and the deep, 
nearly spiritual relationship to the practice this entailed. We may have to search deep 
into our history, even to pre-Roman times, to rediscover a time when we adequately 
respected those who fed us and the importance agriculture played in society, but that 
attitude once represented a major pillar in the collective psyche. It is perhaps a dark and 
cynical remark to say that humans are the only creatures on earth who generally cannot 
feed themselves, but with less than one percent of the American population working in 
agriculture, it is an uneasy truth. Although generally considered a mark of a successful 
society that more specialized industries and nonessential work can occupy the 
population, we should perhaps temper our pride and narcissism with some measure of 
humility. Dependency and vulnerability characterize our current relationship to our 
food, making this project and other ethical accounts of agriculture increasingly 
important in our modern age. It is my hope to continue to pursue these critical ethical 











Colorado Criminal Code. Article 9. Offenses Against Public Peace, Order, and Decency. 
Part 2. Cruelty to Animals. § 18-9-202: 
1. (1)(a) A person commits cruelty to animals if he or she knowingly, recklessly, or with 
criminal negligence overdrives, overloads, overworks, torments, deprives of 
necessary sustenance, unnecessarily or cruelly beats, allows to be housed in a 
manner that results in chronic or repeated serious physical harm, carries or confines 
in or upon any vehicles in a cruel or reckless manner, engages in a sexual act with an 
animal, or otherwise mistreats or neglects any animal, or causes or procures it to be 
done, or, having the charge or custody of any animal, fails to provide it with proper 
food, drink, or protection from the weather consistent with the species, breed, and 
type of animal involved, or abandons an animal. 
o (b) Any person who intentionally abandons a dog or cat commits the offense 
of cruelty to animals. 
2. (1.5)(a) A person commits cruelty to animals if he or she recklessly or with criminal 
negligence tortures, needlessly mutilates, or needlessly kills an animal. 
o (b) A person commits aggravated cruelty to animals if he or she knowingly 
tortures, needlessly mutilates, or needlessly kills an animal. 
3. (1.6) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires: 
o "Serious physical harm" means any of the following: 
(a) Any physical harm that carries a substantial risk of death; 
(b) Any physical harm that causes permanent maiming or that 
involves some temporary, substantial maiming; or 
(c) Any physical harm that causes acute pain of a duration that 
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